Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2020, George Fluitt was indicted on three counts of fraud and offering kickbacks related to genetic testing services that his company, Specialty Drug Testing LLC, provided to Medicare beneficiaries. As part of a nationwide investigation into genetic testing fraud, the Government executed search warrants at laboratories referred to as the Hurricane Shoals Entities (“HSE”), allegedly operated by Khalid Satary. The Government copied several terabytes of data from HSE, some of which were later determined to be material to Fluitt’s defense.In the lower courts, the Government established a “Filter Team” to review materials seized in its investigation and identify any that might be privileged. The Filter Team’s review was governed in part by a Protocol Order, which established a multi-step process for notifying a third party that it might have a claim of privilege and then adjudicating that claim. HSE and Satary provided privilege logs to the Filter Team, asserting thousands of claims of privilege. Both Fluitt and the Filter Team found these privilege logs to be facially deficient as they made only threadbare assertions of privilege, without any accompanying explanation.In the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the appellants failed to establish their claims of privilege. The court also found that the appellants' argument that they are not bound by the Protocol Order was a red herring, as the magistrate judge evaluated the appellants’ privilege logs under the standards established by federal caselaw. The court also rejected the appellants' argument that Fluitt “has not shown a need for the documents” and has not “demonstrated any kind of relevancy.” The court found that the record suggests that Fluitt “has a need” for the potentially privileged documents, as the Government determined that the potentially privileged materials were material to preparing Fluitt’s defense. View "United States v. Fluitt" on Justia Law

David Perez, while on federal supervised release, was recorded by a police surveillance camera holding what appeared to be a firearm. His conditions of release, as well as federal law, prohibited him from possessing a firearm. At a revocation hearing, the government presented the surveillance video as evidence. The district judge asked Perez's probation officer to narrate the video, to which Perez objected and requested to cross-examine her. The district court denied this request, asserting that the probation officer was not a witness and that the narration was only for the hearing transcript. Perez's counsel did not take up the judge's offer to suggest questions for the probation officer.Perez appealed, arguing that the probation officer was effectively an adverse witness and that his rights were violated by the refusal to allow cross-examination. He also contested the district court's finding that he possessed a firearm and the subsequent revocation of his supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that Perez should have been allowed to cross-examine the probation officer. However, the court found this error to be harmless, as the district court did not rely on the probation officer's testimony in its finding that Perez possessed a firearm. The video provided ample evidence of Perez's possession of a firearm, and the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking his supervised release. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. David Perez" on Justia Law

Michael Fuglesten was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a police officer entered his garage without a warrant. The officer had responded to a 911 call about a truck repeatedly driving by a house with loud music. The officer identified the truck as Fuglesten's, knew his license was suspended, and followed him to his home. The officer did not attempt a traffic stop or initiate his overhead lights. Upon reaching Fuglesten's home, the officer approached the garage on foot and interacted with Fuglesten, who was inside the garage. Fuglesten was subsequently arrested and charged.Fuglesten filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's entry into his garage was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and Fuglesten conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Fuglesten had committed the offense of driving under suspension, but did not find evidence of exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lange v. California, exigent circumstances were required for law enforcement to enter Fuglesten's garage without a warrant. The court found that the facts presented to the district court did not establish exigent circumstances. The court concluded that the officer's entry into Fuglesten's garage, without exigent circumstances, constituted an illegal entry. The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Fuglesten to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Fuglesten" on Justia Law

The case involves William Campbell, who, along with his cousin, burglarized an Indiana home and stole over 25 firearms. They sold these firearms to another person. Law enforcement was able to recover eight of the stolen firearms, but the rest remain unaccounted for. Campbell was indicted for possessing the eight recovered firearms as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment by the district court. The court, in its explanation for the sentence, remarked that the missing guns were likely in the hands of other felons, as they are the people who buy stolen guns.The district court adopted the presentence investigation report, which calculated an adjusted offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 108 to 120 months’ imprisonment. The court, however, decided to sentence Campbell to a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. The court explained its sentence with reference to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, discussing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances of Campbell’s case.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Campbell argued that the district court's statement about the missing guns being likely in the hands of other felons amounted to impermissible speculation, requiring the sentence to be vacated. The appellate court, however, disagreed. It reviewed the procedural challenge de novo and found that the district court did not rely on speculative or inaccurate information in imposing the sentence. The court's concern was that the firearms are now unaccounted for, somewhere in the public, where authorities cannot track their owners and whereabouts. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Patrick Dai, a student at Cornell University, who was charged with making interstate threats of violence against Jewish students at the university. The government sought to detain Dai pretrial, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), which allows for pretrial detention of defendants charged with a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, or an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed. Dai argued that this provision did not apply to him as his charge, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), was punishable by at most five years in prison. He contended that the phrase "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed" applied to "crime of violence," thus excluding crimes of violence punishable by less than 10 years.The district court rejected Dai's argument, and he appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that § 3142(f)(1)(A) permits the government to seek detention of defendants charged with any crime of violence, not just those punishable by 10 years or more. The court reasoned that the government's interpretation avoided surplusage, made grammatical sense, and was supported by statutory history. The court concluded that the phrase "for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more is prescribed" did not modify "crime of violence" in § 3142(f)(1)(A). View "United States v. Dai" on Justia Law

Adis Medunjanin was arrested in 2010 and charged with nine terrorism-related counts, including attempting to commit an act of terrorism and possessing a destructive device in furtherance of crimes of violence. The charges stemmed from a plot to conduct coordinated suicide bombings in the New York City subway system. Medunjanin was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment.Medunjanin appealed his conviction, arguing that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possessing a destructive device in furtherance of crimes of violence should be vacated. He claimed that the crimes were predicated on invalid "crimes of violence" in light of a Supreme Court decision, Sessions v. Dimaya. The District Court agreed with the government that one of the § 924(c) convictions should be vacated, but upheld the other because it was predicated on attempted terrorism, which remained a crime of violence.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Medunjanin argued that the attempted terrorism count was an invalid predicate because the jury may have found him guilty of attempted terrorism based on aiding and abetting liability. The court disagreed, holding that the fact that a defendant may have been convicted of an otherwise valid crime of violence based on an aiding and abetting theory of liability has no effect on the crime’s validity as a § 924(c) predicate. The court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "Medunjanin v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a professional photographer who sexually exploited a minor. The defendant initially contacted the victim through a social networking site and began communicating with her through various means, eventually soliciting and receiving explicit images of the victim. The defendant also met the victim in person and sexually abused her. After the victim's parents reported the exploitation to the police, an investigation was launched. The police seized a computer tower, an external hard drive, and other items from the defendant's former residence. A forensic examination of the hard drives revealed explicit images of the victim, communications between the defendant and the victim, and hundreds of images of unidentified females in various stages of undress.The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including aggravated rape of a child and enticement of a minor. He pleaded guilty to all charges, except for the eight counts of aggravated rape of a child, where he pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of statutory rape. After being sentenced, the defendant filed a motion for the return of the seized property. The Commonwealth opposed the return of the property, arguing that it was in the "public interest" to destroy the devices. The Superior Court denied the defendant's request for the return of certain property.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted an application for direct appellate review. The court concluded that the procedural requirements set forth in G. L. c. 276, §§ 4 to 8, must be followed before a forfeiture decree may be issued under G. L. c. 276, § 3. The court vacated the Superior Court orders denying the return of certain property to the defendant and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Commonwealth v. James" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the petitioner, Tom Nichols, also known as Nikki, who is currently serving a prison sentence for sex crimes against children. Nikki, a transgender woman in the process of transitioning, filed a petition for a sealed-record name change, arguing that an open-record proceeding could jeopardize her safety due to her gender identity.The District Court of the Third Judicial District initially denied Nikki's petition. The court's decision was based on the fact that Nikki failed to demonstrate probable cause that her safety was at risk, a requirement under Section 27-31-201, MCA, for a petition to proceed on a sealed-record basis. The court also had to be satisfied that the petitioner was not attempting to avoid debt or hide a criminal record.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that district courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a petition for a sealed-record name change. The Supreme Court would only reverse a district court decision if it was arbitrary or exceeded the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. In this case, the Supreme Court found that Nikki failed to provide specific instances of abuse or explain why an open-record proceeding would change her circumstances at the Montana State Prison. Furthermore, Nikki did not provide any support for the alleged risk of harm from members of the public. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the evidence was insufficient to support Nikki’s petition. View "In re Name Change of Nichols" on Justia Law

The defendant, Robert Wayne Cunningham, was convicted of provocative act murder and other offenses related to a 1995 shootout with the police. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, along with consecutive determinate sentences. The incident occurred when Cunningham and his accomplice, Soley, were under police surveillance due to suspicion of committing a series of armed robberies. The police followed them to a liquor store, where they committed a robbery. The police blocked their car, leading to a shootout initiated by Cunningham, which resulted in Soley's death and injuries to Cunningham and at least one police officer.Cunningham sought sentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 but was unsuccessful. He appealed, arguing that provocative murder is based on the imputation of malice, which he claimed is now barred by the newly enacted Penal Code section 188, subdivision (a)(3). He also contended that the prosecutor's argument that he started the gun battle was equivalent to arguing the now discarded "natural and probable consequences" doctrine.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District disagreed with Cunningham's arguments. The court noted that provocative act murder has been a part of California law since the 1960s and that the legislature's failure to mention it in the new statute indicates it did not intend to discard this theory. The court also stated that the prosecutor's argument did not preclude the statute and that the jury's verdict was informed by the instructions given. The court cited a recent case, People v. Antonelli, where it held that the provocative murder doctrine survived recent legislative enactments. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, denying Cunningham's sentencing relief. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The case involves Maria E. Garcia and Liang Guo Yu, who were convicted for money laundering. The charges stemmed from their involvement with the Villalobos drug trafficking organization (DTO) in Houston, Texas. The DTO was known for moving hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and making yearly profits in the millions. Garcia and Yu were implicated in the seizure of large sums of cash during two separate searches. They were charged with conspiring to launder monetary instruments and aiding and abetting money laundering. Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they committed the offenses.Prior to their trial, the defendants had their motions for a new trial and to suppress denied by the district court. At trial, the government presented testimony from ten witnesses and introduced dozens of exhibits. The jury found Garcia and Yu guilty of both charges. Post-trial, the district court denied all three motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. Garcia was sentenced to two concurrent 78-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release. Yu was sentenced to two concurrent 151-month terms of imprisonment and two concurrent 3-year terms of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments of the district court. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the district court did not err in assessing a sentencing enhancement for Garcia and in denying Yu's motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The court further held that the district court did not err in denying Yu's motion for a new trial as untimely. View "USA v. Garcia" on Justia Law