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18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits intentionally damaging a computer system when there was no permission to engage in that particular act of damage. The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of knowingly causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causing damage without authorization, to a protected computer, in violation of section 1030(a)(5)(A). In this case, defendant was the Information Technology Operations Manager for ClickMotive, a software webpage hosting company. Upset that a coworker had been terminated, defendant sabotaged the company's electronic system by deleting files, disabling backup operations, diverting emails, and preventing remote access to the company's network. The court held that defendant lacked permission to inflict the damage he caused and sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction. Finally, the court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

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Bartholomew publishes Christian ministry music and is a volunteer national spokesperson and the opening act for "Mission: PreBorn" concerts. Bartholomew wrote a pro-life song, “What Was Your Name,” produced a video for the song, and created an account with YouTube, agreeing to be bound by its terms of service. Bartholomew uploaded the video to YouTube, which assigned a URL so that it could be viewed on the internet. Bartholomew publicly shared the URL. By the time YouTube removed it, she claims, the video had been viewed over 30,000 times. The URL for Bartholomew’s video opened an internet page with the image of a distressed face and a statement: This video has been removed because its content violated YouTube’s Terms of Service.’ The screen did not refer to Bartholomew. It contained a hyperlink to a list of examples and tips, YouTube’s “Community Guideline Tips.” Bartholomew sued, claiming that the statement and the Guidelines harmed her reputation (libel per quod). The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, reasoning that, given the breadth of YouTube’s terms of service, and even taking into consideration Bartholomew’s profession, the statement cannot be deemed to subject her to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or [cause her] to be shunned or avoided” or tend to “injure [her] in [her] occupation.” View "Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law

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"Personally identifiable information," pursuant to the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1), means only that information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's video-watching behavior. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that ESPN disclosed plaintiff's personally identifiable information in violation of the Act. Plaintiff alleged that ESPN violated the Act by giving a third party his Roku device serial number and by giving the identity of the video he watched. The panel held that plaintiff had Article III standing to bring his claim because section 2710(b)(1) was a substantive provision protecting consumers' concrete interest in their privacy. On the merits, the panel held that the information described in plaintiff's complaint did not constitute personally identifiable information under the Act. In this case, the information at issue could not identify an individual unless it was combined with other data in the third party's possession, data that ESPN never disclosed and apparently never even possessed. View "Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc." on Justia Law

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Team sells materials to help individuals profit in multi-level marketing businesses. Doe anonymously runs the “Amthrax” blog, in which he criticizes multi-level marketing companies and Team. Doe posted a hyperlink to a downloadable copy of the entirety of “The Team Builder’s Textbook,” copyrighted by Team. After Team served the blog’s host with a take-down notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 512, Doe removed the hyperlink. Team filed suit, seeking only injunctive relief and that the court identify Doe. Doe asserted fair-use and copyright-misuse defenses and that he has a First Amendment right to speak anonymously. The court ultimately entered summary judgment for Team, found that unmasking Doe “was unnecessary to ensure that defendant would not engage in future infringement” and that “defendant has already declared ... that he has complied with the proposed injunctive relief” by destroying the copies of the Textbook in his possession such that “no further injunctive relief is necessary.” The Sixth Circuit remanded with respect to unmasking Doe; the district court failed to recognize the presumption in favor of open judicial records. View "Signature Management Team, LLC v. Doe" on Justia Law

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Thirteen Illinois municipalities claimed that the online travel agencies (OTAs), including Expedia, Priceline, and Travelocity, have withheld money owed to them under their local hotel tax ordinances. The OTAs operate their online travel websites under the “merchant model”; customers pay an OTA directly to reserve rooms at hotels the OTA has contracted with. The participating hotels set a room rental rate. The OTA charges the customer a price that includes that rate, the estimated tax owed to the municipality, and additional charges for the OTA’s services. After the customer’s stay, the hotel invoices the OTA for the room rate and taxes and remits the taxes collected to the municipality. Contracts between hotels and the OTAs confirm that the OTAs do not actually buy, and never acquire the right to enter or grant possession of, hotel rooms. The municipalities claim that OTAs do not remit taxes on the full price that customers pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the OTAs. None of the municipal ordinances place a duty on the OTAs to collect or remit the taxes, so the municipalities have no recourse against the OTAs View "Village of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc." on Justia Law

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OpenRisk filed suit against MicroStrategy after MicroStrategy continued to provide services to OpenRisk's ex-employees after they had left and formed a new company. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to MicroStrategy and held that the federal Copyright Act preempted OpenRisk's computer fraud claims under the Virginia Computer Crimes Act (VCCA). The court explained that the core of OpenRisk's VCCA claims was the unauthorized copying and transfer of its data, and that claim was "equivalent to" a copyright infringement action and was thus preempted. The court also held that MicroStrategy was entitled to summary judgment on OpenRisk's remaining claims of computer trespass, tortious interference, and conspiracy. View "OpenRisk, LLC v. MicroStrategy Services Corp." on Justia Law

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This petition for writ of mandamus arose in the context of a contested trademark action initiated by San Diego Comic Convention (SDCC) against petitioners, over the use of the mark "comic-con" or "comic con." The Ninth Circuit granted the petition and vacated the district court's orders directing petitioners to prominently post on their social medial outlets its order prohibiting comments about the litigation on social media, dubbing this posting a "disclaimer." The panel held that the orders at issue were unconstitutional prior restraints on speech because they prohibit speech that poses neither a clear and present danger nor a serious and imminent threat to SDCC's interest in a fair trial. The panel explained that the well-established doctrines on jury selection and the court's inherent management powers provide an alternative, less restrictive, means of ensuring a fair trial. View "Dan Farr Productions v. USDC-CASD" on Justia Law

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Verizon cellular and data subscribers filed a putative class action against Turn, a middle-man for Internet-based advertisements, challenging the company's use of "zombie" cookies. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for writ of mandamus and vacated the district court's order granting Turn's motion to stay the action and compel arbitration. Applying Bauman v. U. S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1977), the panel held that the majority of the Bauman factors weigh heavily in favor of granting the writ where direct appeal was unavailable; prejudice was not correctable on appeal; and the district court committed clear error by applying New York's equitable estoppel doctrine, rather than California's, and by failing to apply California law correctly. View "Henson v. USDC" on Justia Law

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In order to be eligible for the safe harbor protection of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(c), the defendant must show that the photographs at issue were stored at the direction of the user. The Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion reversing the district court's holding, on summary judgment, that defendant was protected by the safe harbor of the DMCA from liability for posting plaintiff's photographs online and vacating a discovery order. The panel held that the common law of agency applied to safe harbor defenses and that, in this case, there were genuine factual disputes regarding whether the moderators are LiveJournal's agents. The panel addressed the remaining elements of the safe harbor defense and vacated the district court's order denying discovery of the moderators' identities. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that VidAngel had likely violated both the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Copyright Act, and order preliminarily enjoining VidAngel from circumventing the technological measures controlling access to copyrighted works on DVDs and Blu-ray discs owned by the plaintiff entertainment studios, copying those works, and streaming, transmitting, or otherwise publicly performing or displaying them electronically. The Ninth Circuit held that the Family Movie Act of 2005 did not exempt VidAngel from liability for copyright infringement; VidAngel's fair use defense failed; the anti-circumvention provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act covered plaintiffs' technological protection measures, which control both access to and use of copyrighted works; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding irreparable harm, by balancing the equities, and by considering the public interest. View "Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc." on Justia Law