Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the incorporation of the proposed City of St. George in Louisiana. The petition for incorporation was filed in 2018 and was approved by the governor, leading to a special election in which 54% of voters approved the incorporation. However, a legal challenge was filed by Baton Rouge’s Mayor-President and a Metropolitan Councilman, arguing that the petition for incorporation was deficient and that the proposed city would be unable to provide public services within a reasonable period of time. They also contended that the incorporation would have an adverse impact on Baton Rouge.The trial court denied the incorporation, finding that the petition minimally satisfied the statutory requirements and that the incorporation was unreasonable. The court found that St. George would operate at a deficit, affecting the timely provision of public services, and that lost tax revenue would significantly impact Baton Rouge. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of incorporation, finding the petition deficient as it failed to include a plan for the provision of services.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lower courts erred in their calculations of St. George's operating costs and potential revenues. The court also found that the lower courts failed to consider the cost savings that would result from Baton Rouge no longer having to provide services to St. George. The court concluded that St. George could provide public services within a reasonable period of time and that the incorporation was reasonable. The court therefore rendered judgment in favor of the proponents of incorporation. View "BROOME VS. RIALS" on Justia Law

A group of telecommunications carriers, including Assurance Wireless USA, L.P., MetroPCS California, LLC, Sprint Spectrum LLC, T-Mobile USA, Inc., and T-Mobile West LLC, sued the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) over a rule change. The CPUC had altered the mechanism for charging telecommunications providers to fund California’s universal service program. Previously, the program was funded based on revenue, but due to declining revenues, the CPUC issued a rule imposing surcharges on telecommunications carriers based on the number of active accounts, or access lines, rather than revenue.The carriers sought a preliminary injunction against the access line rule, arguing that it was preempted by the Telecommunications Act, which requires providers of interstate telecommunications services to contribute to the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) universal service mechanisms on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis. The carriers argued that the access line rule was inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was inequitable and discriminatory.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the preliminary injunction. The court found that the carriers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their express preemption claims. It held that the access line rule was not inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was not inequitable or discriminatory.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the carriers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. It held that the access line rule was not inconsistent with the FCC's rule and was not inequitable or discriminatory. The court concluded that the carriers had failed to show that the access line rule burdened the FCC's universal service programs or that it unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged any provider. View "ASSURANCE WIRELESS USA, L.P. V. ALICE REYNOLDS" on Justia Law

In 2020, seven victims of a 2016 terrorist bombing in Afghanistan obtained multi-million-dollar default judgments against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and the Haqqani Network. Following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan, the victims, suing as John Doe plaintiffs, sought to attach assets held by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the “World Bank”). The plaintiffs argued that these assets belonged to the Afghan government or the central bank of Afghanistan, and that the Taliban had become the de facto Afghan government and the Afghan central bank its “instrumentality.”The district court granted the World Bank’s and Fund’s motions to quash the plaintiffs' writs of execution. The court found the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) inapplicable in this case. It expressed doubt that the funds the plaintiffs sought to recover belonged to Afghanistan, and it could not recognize an ownership claim by the Taliban to Afghan assets since the United States had not recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The plaintiffs failed to show that the assets at issue fell under the TRIA, and so they had not shown that an exception to the Fund and the World Bank’s immunity applied. On that basis, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction in the case and granted the motions to quash.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the TRIA does not abrogate the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The court concluded that the TRIA applies only to foreign states and international organizations once jurisdiction has been established over them. Because the TRIA leaves the World Bank’s and Fund’s jurisdictional immunity intact, the district court could not entertain the plaintiffs' garnishment action. View "John Does 1-7 v. Taliban" on Justia Law

In 1989, Andrew Johnson was convicted of aggravated burglary and sexual assault. In 2013, a Wyoming state court declared Johnson innocent based on DNA evidence and vacated his convictions. Johnson then filed a lawsuit against Officer Alan Spencer, the Estate of Detective George Stanford, and the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming, alleging that they fabricated evidence, failed to produce exculpatory evidence, and failed to maintain adequate policing policies. The district court dismissed Johnson's claims, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Johnson failed to plausibly allege a fabrication-of-evidence claim against Officer Spencer. Regarding Johnson's claim based on the alleged failure to produce exculpatory evidence, the court determined that Johnson failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated, and thus, Officer Spencer and Detective Stanford were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the district court properly dismissed the claims against the City of Cheyenne because Johnson did not demonstrate that any City of Cheyenne law enforcement officer violated his constitutional rights. View "Johnson v. City of Cheyenne" on Justia Law

In 2021, New York enacted the Affordable Broadband Act (ABA), which required internet service providers to offer broadband internet to qualifying households at reduced prices. A group of trade organizations representing internet service providers sued, arguing that the ABA was preempted by federal law. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and granted a preliminary injunction barring New York from enforcing the ABA. The parties later requested that the district court enter a stipulated final judgment and permanent injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the ABA was not field-preempted by the Communications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996), because the Act does not establish a framework of rate regulation that is sufficiently comprehensive to imply that Congress intended to exclude the states from entering the field. The court also concluded that the ABA was not conflict-preempted by the Federal Communications Commission’s 2018 order classifying broadband as an information service. The court reasoned that the order stripped the agency of its authority to regulate the rates charged for broadband internet, and a federal agency cannot exclude states from regulating in an area where the agency itself lacks regulatory authority. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and vacated the permanent injunction. View "New York State Telecommunications Association, Inc. v. James" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Kirkwood Institute's request for public records from the Office of the Auditor of State in Iowa. The Institute sought emails between the Auditor's office and two investigative reporters. The Auditor's office withheld ten email chains, citing Iowa Code § 11.42 and § 22.7(18), which protect certain types of information. Kirkwood sued, arguing that the Auditor's office failed to show that these exceptions applied to the withheld emails. Additionally, Kirkwood claimed that the Auditor's office failed to disclose an eleventh email chain that had been quoted in a reporter's blog.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Auditor's office, holding that the ten email chains were exempt from production and that no violation occurred with the late turnover of the eleventh email chain. Kirkwood appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. The court found that there was a factual issue as to whether the delay in producing the eleventh email was reasonable. It also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Auditor's office's withholding of nine emails under § 11.42, as it was not immediately apparent that these emails were received in the course of an audit or examination. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision regarding the tenth email withheld under § 22.7(18), agreeing that it fell within the exception created in this statute. View "Kirkwood Institute, Inc. v. Sand" on Justia Law

The case involves Elliott Sterling, who was convicted for engaging in a fraudulent scheme to obtain loan and grant funds from the Department of Education’s Federal Student Aid Program. Sterling submitted fraudulent applications on behalf of students, both real and fictional, and also committed fraud in connection with his educational consulting business. He was indicted for multiple counts of wire fraud, financial aid fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity. Sterling chose to represent himself during the trial after his request for a new counsel was denied.The district court found Sterling competent to waive his right to counsel and allowed him to proceed pro se in his defense. After a 9-day jury trial, Sterling was convicted on all counts. He was sentenced to 132 months of imprisonment, followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. Sterling appealed, raising several Sixth Amendment claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no merit in Sterling’s procedural or substantive challenges. It held that Sterling's waiver of counsel was clear, unequivocal, and voluntary, and that he was competent to represent himself at trial. The court also found that the district court did not err in allowing Sterling to represent himself at his own competency hearing, and that the district court's determination of Sterling's competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. View "United States v. Sterling" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the construction of an offshore wind project aimed at reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The project, proposed by Vineyard Wind 1, LLC, was expected to provide energy sufficient to power 400,000 Massachusetts homes. However, residents of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket opposed the project, arguing that federal agencies failed to properly assess the potential impact of the project on the endangered North Atlantic right whale.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had granted summary judgment in favor of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and Vineyard Wind, rejecting the residents' challenge to a biological opinion issued by the NMFS and relied on by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in permitting the construction of the wind power project.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the residents challenged the lower court's decision, arguing that the NMFS's determination that the incidental harassment of up to twenty right whales constituted a "small number" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. They also argued that NMFS's consideration of the "specified activity" and the "specific geographic region" within which that activity would occur for purposes of issuing the Incidental Harassment Authorization (IHA) to Vineyard Wind was impermissibly narrow in scope.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the NMFS's determination was not arbitrary or capricious and that it had properly delineated the "specific geographic region" for the purposes of the IHA. The court also found that the residents' concerns about the broader effect of the project on the right whale population were unwarranted, as the agency had considered the impact on the entire right whale population in its "negligible impact" analysis, its biological opinion, and in its participation in the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's Environmental Impact Statement. View "Melone v. Coit" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, led by Chris Calnan, who challenged a rule implemented by Maine Emergency Medical Services (Maine EMS) requiring emergency medical service (EMS) workers to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and influenza. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Maine EMS lacked statutory authority to implement such a rule.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had named the correct defendants, that it had jurisdiction to consider the challenge to the rulemaking, and that the EMS Board acted within its authority in implementing the immunization rule. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as moot.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the EMS Board did not exceed its statutory authority in issuing the immunization rule. The court also concluded that the rule aligns with the purpose of the Maine Emergency Medical Services Act of 1982, which is to ensure optimum patient care and the safe handling and transportation of patients. Lastly, the court determined that the EMS Board followed the applicable rulemaking process for the promulgation of the immunization rule. View "Calnan v. Hurley" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of convicted sex offenders who were confined in the Fishkill Residential Treatment Facility (RTF) while on post-release supervision (PRS). The Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) used the Fishkill RTF to confine these offenders past their maximum sentence expiration dates because they were unable to find housing that complied with the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA). The plaintiffs initiated a proceeding in 2016, seeking injunctions, declaratory relief, and class certification, arguing that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF failed to comply with the statutes governing RTFs because it did not offer adequate programming or employment opportunities.The Supreme Court dismissed part of the proceeding and converted the remaining into an action seeking a declaration that DOCCS's operation of the Fishkill RTF was non-compliant with the statutes governing RTFs. The court denied class certification, reasoning that the converted declaratory judgment action would adequately protect the interests of similarly situated offenders. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment and a declaration in their favor. The Supreme Court granted defendants' motion in part, concluding that the internal programming was minimally adequate to satisfy DOCCS's statutory obligations. However, the court agreed with plaintiffs that DOCCS failed to provide adequate community-based opportunities.The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the part that granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and granted defendants' motion in its entirety. The Court concluded that while the statute requires DOCCS to locate RTFs near a community with employment, training, and educational opportunities, there was no mandate that DOCCS offer such opportunities outside the facility.The Court of Appeals held that DOCCS's wholesale refusal to secure community-based opportunities for Fishkill RTF residents constitutes a violation of the statute. The Court concluded that DOCCS, at a minimum, must undertake reasonable efforts to secure community-based opportunities for those persons subject to its RTF programming. However, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the internal programming at the Fishkill RTF was at least minimally adequate. View "Alcantara v Annucci" on Justia Law