Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

FanDuel and DraftKings conduct online fantasy‐sports games. Participants pay an entry fee and select a roster, subject to a budget cap that prevents every entrant from picking only the best players. Results from real sports contests determine how each squad earns points to win cash. Former college football players whose names, pictures, and statistics have been used without their permission sued, claiming that Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute, Code 32‐36‐1‐8, gives them control over the commercial use of their names and data. The district court dismissed the complaint, relying on exemptions for the use of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms "in" material “that has political or newsworthy value” or “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest." The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court of Indiana: Whether online fantasy‐sports operators that condition entry on payment, and distribute cash prizes, need the consent of players whose names, pictures, and statistics are used in the contests, in advertising the contests, or both. Plaintiffs’ details on the websites are not necessarily “in” newsworthy “material” or a form of “reporting” and there is no state law precedent interpreting a statute similar to Indiana’s. The Supreme Court of Indiana may consider not only the statutory text but also plaintiffs’ arguments about the legality of defendants’ fantasy games and the possibility of an extra-textual illegal‐activity exception. View "Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc." on Justia Law

FanDuel and DraftKings conduct online fantasy‐sports games. Participants pay an entry fee and select a roster, subject to a budget cap that prevents every entrant from picking only the best players. Results from real sports contests determine how each squad earns points to win cash. Former college football players whose names, pictures, and statistics have been used without their permission sued, claiming that Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute, Code 32‐36‐1‐8, gives them control over the commercial use of their names and data. The district court dismissed the complaint, relying on exemptions for the use of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms "in" material “that has political or newsworthy value” or “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest." The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Supreme Court of Indiana: Whether online fantasy‐sports operators that condition entry on payment, and distribute cash prizes, need the consent of players whose names, pictures, and statistics are used in the contests, in advertising the contests, or both. Plaintiffs’ details on the websites are not necessarily “in” newsworthy “material” or a form of “reporting” and there is no state law precedent interpreting a statute similar to Indiana’s. The Supreme Court of Indiana may consider not only the statutory text but also plaintiffs’ arguments about the legality of defendants’ fantasy games and the possibility of an extra-textual illegal‐activity exception. View "Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc." on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Google's motion to dismiss in an action brought by plaintiff and her company against Google for failing to remove an offensive blog post. Plaintiff alleged three state law causes of action: defamation; tortious interference with a business relationship; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court concluded that the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230, immunized Google from liability for the publication of third-party content. The court applied the three part test in Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to determine that Google had established immunity. In this case, Google qualified as an interactive computer service provider; plaintiff alleged that a third party created the offensive content on the blog; and plaintiff sought to establish that Google was liable as a publisher of the content. View "Bennett v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Google's motion to dismiss in an action brought by plaintiff and her company against Google for failing to remove an offensive blog post. Plaintiff alleged three state law causes of action: defamation; tortious interference with a business relationship; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court concluded that the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230, immunized Google from liability for the publication of third-party content. The court applied the three part test in Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014), to determine that Google had established immunity. In this case, Google qualified as an interactive computer service provider; plaintiff alleged that a third party created the offensive content on the blog; and plaintiff sought to establish that Google was liable as a publisher of the content. View "Bennett v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Oracle filed a copyright infringement suit against Rimini, a provider of third-party support for Oracle's enterprise software, and Rimini's CEO. The Ninth Circuit affirmed partial summary judgment and partial judgment after trial on Oracle's claims that Rimini infringed its copyright by copying under the license of one customer for work performed for other existing customers or for unknown or future customers; reversed judgment after trial in regard to Oracle's claims under the California Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA), the Nevada Computer Crimes Law (NCCL), and California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), because taking data from a website, using a method prohibited by the applicable terms of use, when the taking itself generally was permitted, did not violate the CDAFA or the NCCL; reversed the determination that Rimini violated the UCL; reduced the award of damages based on Rimini's alleged violation of the CDAFA and NCCL; affirmed the award of prejudgment interest on the copyright claims; reversed the permanent injunction based on violations of the CDAFA; vacated the permanent injunction based on copyright infringement; reversed with respect to the CEO's liability for attorneys' fees; vacated the fee award and remanded for reconsideration; reduced the award of taxable costs; and affirmed the award of non-taxable costs. View "Oracle USA v. Rimini Street" on Justia Law

18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)(A) prohibits intentionally damaging a computer system when there was no permission to engage in that particular act of damage. The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of knowingly causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causing damage without authorization, to a protected computer, in violation of section 1030(a)(5)(A). In this case, defendant was the Information Technology Operations Manager for ClickMotive, a software webpage hosting company. Upset that a coworker had been terminated, defendant sabotaged the company's electronic system by deleting files, disabling backup operations, diverting emails, and preventing remote access to the company's network. The court held that defendant lacked permission to inflict the damage he caused and sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction. Finally, the court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague. View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Bartholomew publishes Christian ministry music and is a volunteer national spokesperson and the opening act for "Mission: PreBorn" concerts. Bartholomew wrote a pro-life song, “What Was Your Name,” produced a video for the song, and created an account with YouTube, agreeing to be bound by its terms of service. Bartholomew uploaded the video to YouTube, which assigned a URL so that it could be viewed on the internet. Bartholomew publicly shared the URL. By the time YouTube removed it, she claims, the video had been viewed over 30,000 times. The URL for Bartholomew’s video opened an internet page with the image of a distressed face and a statement: This video has been removed because its content violated YouTube’s Terms of Service.’ The screen did not refer to Bartholomew. It contained a hyperlink to a list of examples and tips, YouTube’s “Community Guideline Tips.” Bartholomew sued, claiming that the statement and the Guidelines harmed her reputation (libel per quod). The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, reasoning that, given the breadth of YouTube’s terms of service, and even taking into consideration Bartholomew’s profession, the statement cannot be deemed to subject her to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or [cause her] to be shunned or avoided” or tend to “injure [her] in [her] occupation.” View "Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC" on Justia Law

"Personally identifiable information," pursuant to the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. 2710(b)(1), means only that information that would readily permit an ordinary person to identify a specific individual's video-watching behavior. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that ESPN disclosed plaintiff's personally identifiable information in violation of the Act. Plaintiff alleged that ESPN violated the Act by giving a third party his Roku device serial number and by giving the identity of the video he watched. The panel held that plaintiff had Article III standing to bring his claim because section 2710(b)(1) was a substantive provision protecting consumers' concrete interest in their privacy. On the merits, the panel held that the information described in plaintiff's complaint did not constitute personally identifiable information under the Act. In this case, the information at issue could not identify an individual unless it was combined with other data in the third party's possession, data that ESPN never disclosed and apparently never even possessed. View "Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc." on Justia Law

Team sells materials to help individuals profit in multi-level marketing businesses. Doe anonymously runs the “Amthrax” blog, in which he criticizes multi-level marketing companies and Team. Doe posted a hyperlink to a downloadable copy of the entirety of “The Team Builder’s Textbook,” copyrighted by Team. After Team served the blog’s host with a take-down notice under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 512, Doe removed the hyperlink. Team filed suit, seeking only injunctive relief and that the court identify Doe. Doe asserted fair-use and copyright-misuse defenses and that he has a First Amendment right to speak anonymously. The court ultimately entered summary judgment for Team, found that unmasking Doe “was unnecessary to ensure that defendant would not engage in future infringement” and that “defendant has already declared ... that he has complied with the proposed injunctive relief” by destroying the copies of the Textbook in his possession such that “no further injunctive relief is necessary.” The Sixth Circuit remanded with respect to unmasking Doe; the district court failed to recognize the presumption in favor of open judicial records. View "Signature Management Team, LLC v. Doe" on Justia Law

Thirteen Illinois municipalities claimed that the online travel agencies (OTAs), including Expedia, Priceline, and Travelocity, have withheld money owed to them under their local hotel tax ordinances. The OTAs operate their online travel websites under the “merchant model”; customers pay an OTA directly to reserve rooms at hotels the OTA has contracted with. The participating hotels set a room rental rate. The OTA charges the customer a price that includes that rate, the estimated tax owed to the municipality, and additional charges for the OTA’s services. After the customer’s stay, the hotel invoices the OTA for the room rate and taxes and remits the taxes collected to the municipality. Contracts between hotels and the OTAs confirm that the OTAs do not actually buy, and never acquire the right to enter or grant possession of, hotel rooms. The municipalities claim that OTAs do not remit taxes on the full price that customers pay. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the OTAs. None of the municipal ordinances place a duty on the OTAs to collect or remit the taxes, so the municipalities have no recourse against the OTAs View "Village of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc." on Justia Law