Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

After Dr. Paul B. Tartell and Dr. Lee M. Mandel split their practices, Dr. Mandel registered six domain names with variations of Dr. Tartell’s name. Dr. Tartell then filed a complaint against Dr. Mandel, his incorporated practice, and another corporation owned by Dr. Mandel for cybersquatting, false designation of origin, and unfair competition. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred by ruling that Dr. Tartell's name had acquired secondary meaning in the minds of consumers. Although Dr. Tartell produced some evidence relevant to the Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton factors, he failed to produce any substantial evidence of what his name denotes to the consumer; Dr. Tartell’s evidence about the use of his name in academic settings and evidence about his reputation among other medical professionals are not probative of whether his name had acquired secondary meaning; Dr. Tartell produced no substantial evidence to demonstrate the degree of actual recognition by the public; and Dr. Tartell’s remaining evidence says nothing about the perceptions of consumers. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Dr. Mandel and his corporations. View "Tartell v. South Florida Sinus and Allergy Ctr." on Justia Law

The 505 Patent claims “the use of a conventional web browser Back and Forward navigational functionalities without data loss in an online application consisting of dynamically generated web pages,” “retaining information lost in the navigation of online forms.” The district court rejected an infringement suit, deeming this to be an abstract concept, ineligible for patenting, 35 U.S.C. 101. While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International. The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that by setting out the abstract idea of a known technological challenge without setting out any specific disclosures, the Patent “added no elements or combination of elements, sometimes referred to as the inventive concept, sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law or the abstract idea. View "Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc." on Justia Law

OIP Technologies sued Amazon.com alleging infringement of its 713 patent, which claims computer-implemented methods for “pricing a product for sale.” The patent explains that traditionally merchandisers manually determine prices based on their qualitative knowledge of the items, pricing experience, and other business policies. In setting the price of a particular good, the merchandiser estimates the shape of a demand curve for a particular product based on, for example, the good itself, the brand strength, market conditions, seasons, and past sales. The713 patent states that a problem with this approach is that the merchandiser is slow to react to changing market conditions, resulting in an imperfect pricing model where the merchandiser often is not charging an optimal price that maximizes profit and teaches a price-optimization method that “help[s] vendors automatically reach better pricing decisions through automatic estimation and measurement of actual demand to select prices.” The district court granted judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the patent does not claim patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101. The Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the patent claims no more than an abstract idea coupled with routine data-gathering steps and conventional computer activity. View "OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc." on Justia Law

Elonis used the Web site Facebook to post lyrics containing graphically violent language and imagery concerning his wife, co-workers, children, and law enforcement, interspersed with disclaimers that the lyrics were “fictitious” and that Elonis was exercising his First Amendment rights. His boss fired him. His wife obtained an order of protection. Elonis’s former employer contacted the FBI. The agency monitored Elonis’s Facebook activity and charged him under 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which makes it a crime to transmit in interstate commerce “any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.” Elonis requested a jury instruction that the government was required to prove that he intended to communicate a “true threat.” The district court told the jury that Elonis could be found guilty if a reasonable person would foresee that his statements would be interpreted as a threat. Elonis was convicted. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The instruction, requiring only negligence with respect to communication of a threat, is not sufficient to support conviction under Section 875(c). Mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent does not eliminate that requirement. Wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal. This does not mean that a defendant must know that his conduct is illegal, but a defendant must have knowledge of “the facts that make his conduct fit the definition of the offense.” In some cases, a general requirement that a defendant act knowingly is sufficient, but where such a requirement would not protect an innocent actor, the statute must be read to require specific intent. The crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct under Section 875(c) is the threatening nature of the communication, so the mental state requirement must apply to the fact that the communication contains a threat. The requirement is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. The Court did not address whether a mental state of recklessness would also suffice or First Amendment issues. View "Elonis v. United States" on Justia Law

The district court found Apple in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, because Apple facilitated and executed a conspiracy where five of the six largest e-book publishers in the country entered into a horizontal conspiracy to eliminate retail price competition in order to raise e-book prices. The district court issued an external compliance monitor through a permanent injunction. At issue on appeal is the district court’s denial of the motion to disqualify the appointed monitor, and modifications of the injunction. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to disqualify the monitor based on the record before the district court. The court also concluded that, in light of the court's intervening interpretation of the injunction, the terms of the injunction are not currently affected by modifications (if any) made by the district court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decisions of the district court without prejudice. The court ordered the letter at issue disclosing the fee schedule unsealed and directed the Clerk of the Court to make that letter publicly available on the docket. View "United States v. Apple Inc." on Justia Law

The 703 patent concerns a method of delivering internet content. A jury found that Limelight practices every step of the methods disclosed in the patent’s four claims except the “tagging” step, which is performed by Limelight’s customers. Customers must tag the content to be hosted and delivered by Limelight’s content delivery network. Limelight instructs its customers how to tag, and employees are on call if customers require additional assistance. In a 2014 decision, the Federal Circuit held that because Limelight did not perform all of the steps of the asserted method claims and because there was no basis on which to impose liability on Limelight for the actions of its customers who carried out the other steps Limelight did not directly infringed the patent under 35 U.S.C. 271(a). After remand by the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit again found no infringement, stating that the statutory framework “does not admit to the sweeping notions of common-law tort liability argued in this case.” The court noted that the case involved neither agency nor contract nor joint enterprise. Encouraging or instructing others to perform an act is not the same as performing the act oneself and does not result in direct infringement. View "Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against BevMo seeking civil penalties for violation of Civil Code section 1747.08 of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1747 et seq. Plaintiff purchased alcohol online through BevMo's website and elected to pick up his order at a BevMo store. The court concluded that plaintiff was bound by the allegation in his initial complaint that the transaction was completed online when he paid for the merchandise with his credit card. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Apple Inc. v. Superior Court, the court concluded that section 1747.08, subdivision (a) does not apply to plaintiff's online purchase of merchandise that he subsequently retrieved at the retail store. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of BevMo. View "Ambers v. Beverages & More, Inc." on Justia Law

Aaron’s stores sell and lease residential and office furniture, consumer electronics, and appliances. Byrd leased a laptop computer from Aspen, an Aaron’s franchisee. Although Byrd asserts that she made full payments, an Aspen agent came to repossess the laptop, claiming that the payments had not been made. The agent allegedly presented a screenshot of a poker website Byrd had visited as well as a picture of Byrd taken by the laptop’s camera. Aspen obtained the picture and screenshot through spyware named “PC Rental Agent” that can collect screenshots, keystrokes, and webcam images from the computer and its users. Between November 16, 2010 and December 20, 2010, the Byrds alleged that this spyware secretly accessed their laptop 347 times on 11 different days. According their putative class action, alleging violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, 895 customers had surveillance conducted through PC Rental Agent. Concluding that the proposed classes were not ascertainable, the district court denied class certification. The Third Circuit reversed. The court erred by: misstating the rule governing ascertainability; engrafting an “underinclusive” requirement; finding that an “overly broad” class was not ascertainable; and improperly applying precedent to the issue of whether “household members” could be ascertainable. View "Byrd v. Aaron's Inc" on Justia Law

Peter Ricci, a Teamsters member since 1983, refused to endorse Union President Doyle in 2002. For the next 10 years, Ricci claims, he suffered retaliation. He was fired from jobs he should have kept; he was not placed in jobs he should have gotten; and generally disfavored, even as compared with members with less seniority. In 2012, members of the Union distributed newsletters containing statements about the Riccis. Those newsletters were also published on a website hosted on GoDaddy’s web servers. The Riccis claim that GoDaddy refused to investigate Ricci’s complaints. In the Ricci’s pro se defamation and retaliation suit, the district court dismissed all claims against GoDaddy and federal claims against the Union. The Second Circuit affirmed. GoDaddy is immune from the defamation claims under the Communications Decency Act of 1996: “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1), and “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” The labor claims were barred by the NLRA’s six‐ month statute of limitations, 29 U.S.C. 160(b). View "Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456" on Justia Law

Fridman paid her mortgage electronically, using the online payment system on the website of her mortgage servicer, NYCB. By furnishing the required information and clicking on the required spot, she authorized NYCB to collect funds from her Bank of America account. Although Fridman filled out the form within the grace period allowed by her note, NYCB did not credit her payment for two business days, causing Fridman to incur a late fee. Fridman filed suit on behalf of herself and a putative class, alleging that NYCB’s practice of not crediting online payments on the day that the consumer authorizes them violates the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601. The district court granted NYCB summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An electronic authorization for a mortgage payment entered on the mortgage servicer’s website is a “payment instrument or other means of payment.” TILA requires mortgage services to credit these authorizations when they “reach[] the mortgage servicer.” View "Fridman v. NYCB Mortgage Co. LLC" on Justia Law