Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

Verizon challenged the FCC's Open Internet Order, which imposed disclosure, anti-blocking, and anti-discrimination requirements on broadband providers. The court concluded that the Commission has established that section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 1302(a), (b), vests it with affirmative authority to enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband infrastructure; the Commission reasonably interpreted section 706 to empower it to promulgate rules governing broadband providers' treatment of Internet traffic, and its justification for the specific rules at issue here - that they will preserve and facilitate the "virtuous circle" of innovation that has driven the explosive growth of the Internet - was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence; given that the Commission has chosen to classify broadband providers in a manner that exempts them from treatment as common carriers, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 201 et seq., expressly prohibits the Commission from nonetheless regulating them as such; and because the Commission has failed to establish that the anti-discrimination and anti-blocking rules did not impose per se common carrier obligations, the court vacated those portions of the Open Internet Order. View "Verizon v. FCC, et al." on Justia Law

ESR’s 236 patent, as amended, claims a computer security device and method for preventing unauthorized individuals from obtaining access to a local computer network. Its specification describes an “intelligent network security device” (INSD), capable of balancing the desire for network security against the need for network accessibility. The INSD protects a local network by: monitoring the data packets flowing into and out of the network in order to detect suspicious patterns of communications; assigning weighted values to any threatening activity it detects; and blocking communications based on their assigned weight using a firewall. A third party requested reexamination of the original patent and the PTO considered prior art. The examiner rejected certain claims as obvious. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board and the Federal Circuit affirmed. View "In re: Enhanced Sec. Research LLC" on Justia Law

The central processing unit (CPU) enables a computing device to execute instructions contained in software. For software to run on CPU, it must be compiled or translated from high-level programming language, written in a human-readable syntax (source code), into machine-readable form (machine code), which is processor-specific. Particular compilers can only translate programs into machine code for particular processors. Java is programming language that allows developers to write programs that can run on different processors without being recompiled for each system by using a single compiler that translates Java programs into “bytecodes” instead of processor-specific machine code. Java bytecodes do not run directly on the CPU, but on a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) that translates them into processor-specific machine code. Programs written in Java can run on any platform and any operating system. Computing devices also vary in how they store data in memory. Machine code or “instruction sets” may be “stack-based” or “register-based.” Although most modern processors use a register-based approach, Java bytecodes are stack-based. A device using a register-based processor can run Java programs using a JVM that translates into register-based instructions, but it takes longer. Nazomi has two patents that address the issue, describing a hardware-based JVM capable of processing stack-based instructions, that also can run legacy (register-based) applications without using the JVM. Defendants are manufacturers that incorporate processors into their products. Nazomi sued, alleging patent infringement. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, construing the asserted claims to require a hardware and software combination capable of processing both register-based and stack-based instructions; without the enabling certain software, the hardware at issue cannot process stack-based instructions. Defendants’ apparatuses do not include that software. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Nazomi Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nokia Corp." on Justia Law

After plaintiff purchased a background check and report from Intelius on the Internet, plaintiff discovered that Adaptive, a separate company from Intelius, had been charging his credit card each month for a Family Safety Report. Plaintiff and others filed suit against Intelius in state court. Intelius then filed a third-party complaint against Adaptive. Adaptive filed a motion to compel arbitration of both Intelius's and plaintiff's claims. The court held that plaintiff did not enter into a contract with Adaptive to purchase the Family Safety Report, and did not enter into a contract with Adaptive to arbitrate. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Intelius Inc." on Justia Law

Petronas is a major oil and gas company located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and GoDaddy is the world's largest domain name registrar. After a third party registered the domain names "petronastower.net" and "petronastowers.net" and then used GoDaddy's domain name forwarding service to direct the disputed domain names to an adult entertainment web site, Petronas filed suit against GoDaddy alleging contributory cybersquatting under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of GoDaddy. The court affirmed, holding that the Act did not include a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting because: (1) the plain text of the Act did not apply to the conduct that would be actionable under such a theory; (2) Congress did not intend to implicitly include common law doctrines applicable to trademark infringement because the Act created a new cause of action that was distinct from traditional trademark remedies; and (3) allowing suits against registrars for contributory cybersquatting would not advance the goals of the statute. View "Petronas v. GoDaddy.com" on Justia Law

The ability of consumers to make purchases on the internet from out-of-state merchants without paying Illinois sales or use taxes caused Illinois retailers to ask the legislature to “level the playing field.” The result was a taxing statute, Public Act 96-1544, effective in 2011, called the “click-through” nexus law. The law was challenged by a group of internet publishers that display website texts or images, such as a retailer’s logo, containing a link to a retailer’s website; they are compensated by the retailer when a consumer clicks on the link and makes a purchase from the retailer. Out-of-state retailers who use such arrangements to generate sales of over $10,000 per year become subject to taxation under the statute. Their challenge was based on the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, which prohibits discriminatory taxes on electronic transactions, and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute is invalid. The court noted that such marketing, when conducted through print media or on-the-air broadcasting, does not give rise to tax obligations under the Illinois statute. The enactment is a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce within the meaning of federal law, which preempts it. The court did not reach the commerce clause issue. View "Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer" on Justia Law

TecSec’s 702, 452, and 781 Patents derive from a common parent application and disclose a system and a method for providing security in a data network by nesting encrypted objects into other objects which are also encrypted, allowing a system to employ different security levels to restrict access to specific compartments of data. The district court found no infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that the court correctly construed the term “multi-level multimedia security,” but incorrectly limited the encrypted data to objects in multimedia form. The court also erred in holding that the term “digital logic means” was a means-plus-function limitation. TecSec may be able to prove infringement against every defendant except PayPal. View "TecSec, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp." on Justia Law

The patent, entitled “Intermediate Network Authentication,” concerns internet security, and was developed by a scientist at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The NRL allowed the patent to lapse for nonpayment of the 7.5-year maintenance fee. Two weeks after the lapse, NRL received an inquiry from Network Signatures about licensing the patent and successfully petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to accept delayed payment of the fee. Network Signatures sued State Farm for infringement of the patent. In defense, State Farm asserted that the patent was permanently unenforceable on the ground that the NRL patent attorney had engaged in inequitable conduct by “falsely representing” to the PTO that the NRL’s non-payment of the maintenance fee was “unintentional.” The district court granted summary judgment of inequitable conduct, and found the patent unenforceable. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the PTO Director acted in accordance with law and within his discretion in excusing the delayed payment, and that inequitable conduct was not established. View "Network Signatures, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Inc." on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer’s Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish.” Elonis’s supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having “keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder” that their son “should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Google under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, after the antennas and software installed in Google's Street View cars collected basic identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks, as well as gathered and stored "payload data" that was sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss based on the Wiretap Act's exemption for electronic communication that was readily accessible to the general public. The court held that the phrase "radio communication" in section 2510(16) excluded payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. Consequently, the definition of "readily accessible to the general public [] with respect to a radio communication" in section 2510(16) did not apply to the exemption for an "electronic communication" that was "readily accessible to the general public" under section 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g)(i). The court also held that payload data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network was not "readily accessible to the general public" under the ordinary meaning of the phrase as it was used in section 2511(2)(g)(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Joffe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law