Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

The ability of consumers to make purchases on the internet from out-of-state merchants without paying Illinois sales or use taxes caused Illinois retailers to ask the legislature to “level the playing field.” The result was a taxing statute, Public Act 96-1544, effective in 2011, called the “click-through” nexus law. The law was challenged by a group of internet publishers that display website texts or images, such as a retailer’s logo, containing a link to a retailer’s website; they are compensated by the retailer when a consumer clicks on the link and makes a purchase from the retailer. Out-of-state retailers who use such arrangements to generate sales of over $10,000 per year become subject to taxation under the statute. Their challenge was based on the federal Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, which prohibits discriminatory taxes on electronic transactions, and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute is invalid. The court noted that such marketing, when conducted through print media or on-the-air broadcasting, does not give rise to tax obligations under the Illinois statute. The enactment is a discriminatory tax on electronic commerce within the meaning of federal law, which preempts it. The court did not reach the commerce clause issue. View "Performance Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hamer" on Justia Law

TecSec’s 702, 452, and 781 Patents derive from a common parent application and disclose a system and a method for providing security in a data network by nesting encrypted objects into other objects which are also encrypted, allowing a system to employ different security levels to restrict access to specific compartments of data. The district court found no infringement. The Federal Circuit reversed in part, holding that the court correctly construed the term “multi-level multimedia security,” but incorrectly limited the encrypted data to objects in multimedia form. The court also erred in holding that the term “digital logic means” was a means-plus-function limitation. TecSec may be able to prove infringement against every defendant except PayPal. View "TecSec, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp." on Justia Law

The patent, entitled “Intermediate Network Authentication,” concerns internet security, and was developed by a scientist at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The NRL allowed the patent to lapse for nonpayment of the 7.5-year maintenance fee. Two weeks after the lapse, NRL received an inquiry from Network Signatures about licensing the patent and successfully petitioned the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to accept delayed payment of the fee. Network Signatures sued State Farm for infringement of the patent. In defense, State Farm asserted that the patent was permanently unenforceable on the ground that the NRL patent attorney had engaged in inequitable conduct by “falsely representing” to the PTO that the NRL’s non-payment of the maintenance fee was “unintentional.” The district court granted summary judgment of inequitable conduct, and found the patent unenforceable. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the PTO Director acted in accordance with law and within his discretion in excusing the delayed payment, and that inequitable conduct was not established. View "Network Signatures, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Inc." on Justia Law

Elonis’s wife left their home with their children. Elonis began experiencing trouble at work at an amusement park, reportedly leaving early and crying at his desk. An employee Elonis supervised, Morrissey, claimed sexual harassment. In October Elonis posted on Facebook a photograph taken for his employer’s Halloween Haunt. The photograph showed Elonis in costume holding a knife to Morrissey’s neck. Elonis added the caption “I wish.” Elonis’s supervisor saw the posting and fired Elonis. Days later, Elonis began posting statements on Facebook about having “keys for the fucking gates … sinister plans for all my friends,” and, concerning his wife, “would have smothered your ass … dumped your body … and made it look like a rape and murder” that their son “should dress up as matricide for Halloween … head on a stick” and “I’m not going to rest until your body is a mess, soaked in blood and dying from all the little cuts.” Following issuance of a state court protective order, Elonis posted statements concerning shooting at his wife’s house, using explosives, and “I’m checking out and making a name for myself … hell hath no fury like a crazy man in a kindergarten class.” After being visited by federal agents, he posted statements about blowing up SWAT members. Elonis was convicted of transmitting in interstate commerce communications containing a threat to injure the person of another, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not subjectively intend his Facebook posts to be threatening. A 2003 Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. Black, did not overturn its prior holding that a statement is a true threat when a reasonable speaker would foresee the statement would be interpreted as a threat. View "United States v. Elonis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Google under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, after the antennas and software installed in Google's Street View cars collected basic identifying information transmitted by Wi-Fi networks, as well as gathered and stored "payload data" that was sent and received over unencrypted Wi-Fi connections. On appeal, Google challenged the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss based on the Wiretap Act's exemption for electronic communication that was readily accessible to the general public. The court held that the phrase "radio communication" in section 2510(16) excluded payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network. Consequently, the definition of "readily accessible to the general public [] with respect to a radio communication" in section 2510(16) did not apply to the exemption for an "electronic communication" that was "readily accessible to the general public" under section 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(g)(i). The court also held that payload data transmitted over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network was not "readily accessible to the general public" under the ordinary meaning of the phrase as it was used in section 2511(2)(g)(i). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Joffe v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Grand Resort, which has operated in the Great Smoky Mountains since 1982, claims that TripAdvisor’s publication of a survey that concluded that Grand Resort was the dirtiest hotel in America caused irreparable damage to its business and that TripAdvisor used a flawed rating system that distorted actual performance and perspective. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the “dirtiest hotels” list is protected opinion; it reflects TripAdvisor’s users’ subjective opinions and is not capable of being defamatory. The court rejected a motion to amend to add claims of trade libel-injurious falsehood and tortious interference with prospective business relationships to the claims of false light-invasion of privacy and of defamation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that amendment of the complaint would be futile. View "Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC" on Justia Law

Stock was indicted for transmitting a threat in interstate commerce 18 U.S.C. 875(c) after he posted a notice on Craig‟s List: i went home loaded in my truck and spend the past 3 hours looking for this douche with the expressed intent of crushing him in that little piece of shit under cover gray impala hooking up my tow chains and dragging his stupid ass down to creek hills and just drowning him in the falls. but alas i can’t fine that bastard anywhere . . . i really wish he would die, just like the rest of these stupid fucking asshole cops. so J.K.P. if you read this i hope you burn in hell. i only wish i could have been the one to send you there.” The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, stating that it was satisfied that the government included sufficient context in the indictment that a reasonable jury could find that Stock’s statement expressed intent to injure in the present or future. View "United States v. Stock" on Justia Law

Tragas bought information that is encoded in the magnetic strip on the back of credit and debit cards from overseas suppliers and re-sold the information to the Hunter brothers, who created “clone” gift and credit cards with which they purchased goods and bona fide gift cards. Tragas and the Hunters communicated online. Police discovered records of their conversations on the Hunters’ computer. Transcripts of the conversations were read at trial. Although the parties did not use names, a picture of Tragas appeared on the account and Tragas made purchases with card information exchanged during the conversations. Tragas purchased a house in Florida after a conversation about buying a house in Florida. As a result of the scheme, credit and debit card users and their financial institutions lost $2.18 million. Tragas was convicted of conspiracy to commit access device fraud offenses, 18 U.S.C. 1029(b); aiding and abetting unlawful activity under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims that the prosecutor improperly read evidence aloud, that the court should have given the jury a specific unanimity instruction, that the Travel Act convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and that her Vienna Convention rights were violated. The court remanded the sentence; the court used an incorrect version of the Guidelines. View "United States v. Tragas" on Justia Law

Taurus sued DaimlerChrysler, alleging that external websites infringed its patent for “a computer system for managing product knowledge related to products offered for sale by a selling entity.” Daimler Chrysler asserted license and release defenses, asserted a breach of contract counterclaim, and filed a contract claim against third-party defendants (including Orion), which, it claimed violated a 2006 patent licensing agreement between DaimlerChrysler and Orion, to settle prior patent infringement suits. The district court entered summary judgment, finding that the accused websites did not infringe any asserted claims and that certain claims were invalid as anticipated by prior art. The district court found the DaimlerChrysler suit to be exceptional under 35 U.S.C. 285, and awarded damages of $1,644,906.12, for costs incurred in Chrysler’s defense. With respect to remaining issues, the district court: found that certain third parties were alter egos and declined to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; held that the 2006 agreement did not provide a release to the infringement alleged in the patent suit; held that issues of fact remained as to whether certain third parties had breached a warranty in the 2006 agreement; held that Orion had breached the warranty; and imposed sanctions on Orion and another for pre-trial witness tampering (those parties were not permitted to present evidence to support their defense that Chrysler did not rely on the warranty). The Federal Circuit affirmed, except with respect to attorney fees. View "Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against Bresnan alleging violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2520-21, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, and Montana state law for invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels in connection with targeted advertising they received while using Bresnan's Internet service. The district court declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause in the service subscriber agreement, provided to all Bresnan customers, specifying that New York law should apply, and an arbitration clause. The court held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion further limited the savings clause in the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-2 et seq., and therefore, the court held that the FAA preempted Montana's reasonable expectations/fundamental rights rule and that the district court erred in not applying New York law because a state's preempted public policy was an impermissible basis on which to reject the parties' choice-of-law selection. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's denial of Bresnan's motion to compel arbitration and remanded to the district court with instructions to apply New York law to the arbitration agreement. View "Mortensen, et al. v. Bresnan Communications, LLC" on Justia Law