Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

Denson spent about a year in federal prison for mail and wire fraud after he got caught up in a "Nigerian" money scam, 18 U.S.C. 1341 & 1343. After persons in Africa emailed Denson saying that he had inherited the rights to an overseas company worth $9-plus million Denson called a local Secret Service office. An agent warned him not to participate and that he could be criminally liable. Denson took thousands of dollars from persons who had trusted him to help with some "window-washing invention" he had "a patent for." Denson called the agent again and admitted that he had "deceived" others into giving him money. Meeting with some agents two days later, Denson described his scheme. He had tried to get an undercover agent to "invest" $30,000 in an overseas-construction venture, handing the agent false documents. The First Circuit upheld sentences of 15 months for supervised release (sentencing range 4-10 months) and 30 months terms for the fraud convictions, to run consecutively with the 15-month term. The court rejected a challenge to a “willful blindness” jury instruction. View "United States v. Denson" on Justia Law

Flava, which specializes in production and distribution of videos of black men engaged in homosexual acts, obtained a preliminary injunction against myVidster, an online social bookmarking service by which people refer sites to those with similar tastes, based on a finding that myVidster is a contributory infringer. The Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction. A Flava customer is authorized only to download the video for his personal use. If instead he uploaded it to the Internet and so by doing so created a copy (because the downloaded video remains in his computer), he was infringing. The court remanded for determination of whether myVidster was a contributory infringer if a visitor to its website bookmarks the video and later someone clicks on the bookmark and views the video. View "Flava Works, Inc v. Marques Rondale Gunter, et al" on Justia Law

01 Communique is the owner of the 479 Patent, which relates to technology that enables one computer to access another computer remotely via the Internet. The patent contains five independent claims describing systems, methods, and products for enabling such remote access, as well as numerous claims dependent therefrom. It discloses use of a “locator server computer” as an intermediary between a “remote computer” (the computer seeking access) and a “personal computer” (the computer to be accessed). The locator server computer “includes” software, referred to in the patent as a “location facility,” that locates the personal computer. The district court entered summary judgment of noninfringement, based on construction of a single claim term, “location facility.” The Federal Circuit vacated, finding the claim construction erroneous. View "01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Logmein, Inc." on Justia Law

Antor owns the 961 patent relating “to a method and apparatus for transmitting information recorded on digital disks from a central server to subscribers via a high data rate telecommunications network.” The goal of the ’961 patent is to allow subscribers to access and to receive information (digital media such as music, images, documents, video, and software) stored on information systems over a telecommunications network. On reexamination the Patent and Trademark Office rejected the patent as anticipated and obvious over four references. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board correctly held that the existence of licenses under the patent is, alone, insufficient to overcome the prima facie case of obviousness View "In re: Antor Media Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant hacked the email account of then-Alaska governor and Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. After forensic examinations revealed that he took action to remove information from his computer relating to the incident, he was indicted on several counts, including identity theft, but only convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1519. Section 1519, part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, prohibits knowing destruction or alteration of any record with intent to impede, obstruct, or influence investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of any federal department or agency or in relation to or in contemplation of any such matter or case. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the law was unconstitutionally vague and that there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant's posts indicated "contemplation" of a federal investigation.View "United States v. Kernell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns patents, directed to a computer-aided method and system for processing credit applications from car dealers over electronic networks. The patents claim priority to and incorporate the 403 patent, filed in 1995. The district court entered judgment of noninfringement on certain claims; of invalidity for failure to claim patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101 with respect to other claims; and of invalidity for indefiniteness on others. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. With respect to infringement, the district court improperly carved-out the Internet from its construction of "communications medium" and improperly construed "central processing means." Finding "central processing means" indefinite, the court invalidated three claims for failure to recite sufficient structure to perform claimed functions. Certain claims were invalid as being directed to an abstract idea preemptive of a fundamental concept or idea that would foreclose innovation in the area. View "Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber" on Justia Law

This matter was before the court on plaintiff's motion to disregard the testimony of defendant on certain subjects. When called as an adverse witness during plaintiff's case-in-chief, defendant invoked his constitutional rights against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution and refused to answer various questions concerning, among other things, allegations that he downloaded confidential data to USB devices in the final weeks of his employment with plaintiff and retained those devices and data after his employment ended. The court concluded that defendant's testimony on cross-examination did extend into certain subjects he refused to address on direct, albeit not as broadly as plaintiff contended. Therefore, the court held that defendant's invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination required that the court disregard his testimony as to those subjects and, to that limited extent, granted plaintiff's motion.View "W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Darrell Long and BHA Group, Inc. (d/b/a GE Energy)" on Justia Law

Over seven days in 2009, Ocean Bank authorized six apparently fraudulent withdrawals, totaling $588,851.26, from an account held by Patco, after the perpetrators correctly supplied Patco's customized answers to security questions. Although the bank's security system flagged each transaction as unusually "high-risk" because they were inconsistent with the timing, value, and geographic location of Patco's regular orders, the system did not notify commercial customers of such information and allowed the payments to go through. Ocean Bank was able to block or recover $243,406.83. Patco sued, alleging that the bank should bear the loss because its security system was not commercially reasonable under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, 4-1101) and that Patco had not consented to the procedures. The district court held that the bank's security system was commercially reasonable and entered judgment in favor of the bank. The First Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on commercial reasonableness and remanded for determination of what, if any, obligations or responsibilities Article 4A imposes on Patco. View "Patco Constr. Co., Inc. v. People's United Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 2 and was sentenced to 151 months, for participation in an advance-fee scheme, in which the victim is persuaded to pay a sum of money up front in order to receive a larger sum of money at a later. The district court concluded, based in part on email exchanges, that he was a manager or supervisor of at least one other participant in the scheme, and that the overall criminal activity involved five or more participants. The Second Circuit affirmed. Courts may rely on unique email addresses in assessing a defendant’s role in a scheme and calculating the number of participants for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Diamreyan" on Justia Law

UMG filed suit against Veoh for direct and secondary copyright infringement where users of Veoh's service have in the past been able, without UMG's authorization, to download videos containing songs for which UMG owned a copyright. The district court granted summary judgment to Veoh after determining that it was protected by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(c), "safe harbor" limiting service providers' liability for "infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." The court affirmed the district court's determination on summary judgment that Veoh was entitled to section 512(c) safe harbor protection where Veoh met all the section 512(c) requirements. The district court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims of secondary liability against the Investor Defendants. The court further affirmed the district court's determination that, in this case, attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 68. The court remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether Veoh was entitled to Rule 68 costs excluding attorney's fees.View "UMG Recordings, Inc., et al. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, et al." on Justia Law