Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo’s server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.” The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system “performs,” even when it only enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo’s activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are “the public” under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law

The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly,” 17 U.S.C. 106(4), including the right to “transmit or otherwise communicate ... the [copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times,” section 101. Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet. Aereo’s server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by an antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder and streams the show to the subscriber, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast. The owners of program copyrights unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing their right to “perform” their copyrighted works “publicly.” The Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Aereo performs the works within the meaning of section 101 and does not merely supply equipment that allows others to do so. The Court noted that the Act was amended in 1976 to make the law applicable to community antenna television (CATV) providers by clarifying that an entity that acts like a CATV system “performs,” even when it only enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals. Aereo’s activities are similar; it sells a service that allows subscribers to watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being broadcast. That Aereo’s system remains inert until a subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program is not critical. Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers watch a program. The Court stated that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to multiple people, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to them, regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes and whether it makes an individual personal copy for each viewer. Aero subscribers are “the public” under the Act: a large number of people, unrelated and unknown to each other. View "Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted of interstate stalking, cyberstalking, and mailing a threatening communication (18 U.S.C. 2261A(1)-(2), 876(c)), based on communications with his estranged wife and minor child, was sentenced to 137 months. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a change of venue or transfer. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Defendant waived challenge to the indictment under FRCP 12(e); he did not show good cause for failing to raise the challenge before trial. The court acted within its discretion in allowing evidence of prior bad acts and imposing the sentence. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Illinois law permits purchasers of tickets to sporting contests, concerts, and similar events to resell tickets via auction sites on the Internet. Chicago, which imposes an amusement tax on the original ticket price, contends that the websites through which tickets are resold must collect and remit an additional tax on the difference between the original price and the resale price. In parallel cases, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided that Illinois law does not allow Chicago to collect its tax from the auction sites. In a case involving another online site, the Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment against the city and denied the city's motion for an extension to allow petition for rehearing to the Illinois Supreme Court. View "City of Chicago v. Stubhub!, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a proposed class action settlement between AOL and plaintiffs where the parties agreed that AOL would make a series of charitable donations. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the proposed class action settlement, including a proposed cy pres settlement distribution. The court held that the cy pres distributions here did not comport with the court's cy pres standards. While the donations were made on behalf of a nationwide plaintiff class, they were distributed to geographically isolated and substantively unrelated charities. The court concluded that the district court judge did not have to recuse herself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) or (b)(4), 5(iii). The court declined to address the issue of whether the class notice was sufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "Nachshin, et al. v. AOL, LLC" on Justia Law

After agents traced an Internet site containing child pornography to a computer shop, they obtained a warrant and searched hard drives of the owner's personal computers, where they found files containing pornography. The owner was convicted of knowing possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and sentenced to 84 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed. A reasonable jury could rationally conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that his own computer contained the files, even if he did not download them himself, and that they were obtained by Internet file sharing. View "United States v. Salva-Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant, convicted on 11 child-pornography related offenses )18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (d)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1), (a)(5)(B), and (b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2257(f)(4)), was sentenced to 16 years in prison followed by eight years of supervised release. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The warrant, which authorized search and seizure of the entire computer server, was not overbroad. In general,if a computer search is limited to a search for evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the executing officers to open the various types of files located in a computer's hard drive in order to determine whether they contain such evidence.The government provided an indexed list of images and files to the defense, six weeks before trial, and complied with Rule 16. Punishing, through multiple offenses, a defendant who funnels child pornography through different websites is consistent with Congress's intent to halt the dissemination of such images and to stop the sexual abuse of children. While noting "troubling" aspects to the rationale, the court affirmed the below-Guidelines sentence.View "United States v. Richards" on Justia Law

Hackers breached the security of the database for the grocery store where plaintiffs shop. The district court determined that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Maine law for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied warranty, strict liability, and failure to notify customers. Although the court concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged breach of implied contract, negligence, and violation of the unfair practices portion of the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, it dismissed those claims because alleged injuries were too unforeseeable and speculative to be cognizable under Maine law. The First Circuit affirmed in part, but reversed dismissal of the negligence and implied contract claims. Mitigation damages are available under those claims, for card replacement costs and credit insurance. View "In Re: Hannaford Bros Co. Cust" on Justia Law

The Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. 3541–49, requires that federal agencies meet information security standards. Compliance is monitored by the Office of Management and Budget. The Department of Justice purchased a license for plaintiff’s compliance product. Plaintiff participated with DOJ in seeking designation as a "Center of Excellence." Without notifying plaintiff, DOJ developed an alternative product, accessing plaintiff's database to learn the system’s architecture. OMB selected DOJ as a Center of Excellence and required agencies to purchase from COEs. DOJ’s product substituted its alternative for plaintiff's software. Plaintiff filed, in district court, a Lanham Act claim; a common law unfair competition claim; and a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Months later, plaintiff filed, in the Court of Federal Claims, claims of: breach of oral or implied contract, breach of license agreement, and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all but the Lanham Act claim. The Claims Court dismissed all claims, applying 28 U.S.C. 1500, which precludes it from exercising jurisdiction over "any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff … has pending in any other court any suit … against the United States." The Federal Circuit reversed, in part, reasoning that the license agreement claim does not arise from substantially the same facts as the district court claim. View "Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Suzlon's demand that Microsoft produce documents from the Microsoft Hotmail email account of Rajagopalan Sridhar, an Indian citizen imprisoned abroad. Microsoft objected to the production and the district court agreed, finding that Sridhar was entitled to the protections of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. 2510-2522, even though he was a foreign citizen. The court held that the ECPA protected the domestic communications of non-citizens like Sridhar. Thus, the decision of the district court denying the production of documents was affirmed. View "Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law