Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

Google owns YouTube, an online video-sharing platform that is popular among children. Google’s targeted advertising is aided by technology that delivers curated, customized advertising based on information about specific users. Google’s technology depends partly on what Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regulations call “persistent identifiers,” information “that can be used to recognize a user over time and across different Web sites or online services.” In 2013, the FTC adopted regulations under COPPA that barred the collection of children’s “persistent identifiers” without parental consent. The plaintiff class alleged that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent. They pleaded only state law causes of action but also alleged that Google’s activities violated COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were preempted by COPPA.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the third amended complaint on preemption grounds. The court remanded so that the district court can consider, in the first instance, the alternative arguments for dismissal to the extent those arguments were properly preserved. The panel held that state laws that supplement, or require the same thing as federal law, do not stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objectives, and are not “inconsistent.” The panel was not persuaded that the insertion of “treatment” in the preemption clause evinced clear congressional intent to create an exclusive remedial scheme for enforcement of COPPA requirements. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to or proscribe the same conduct forbidden by COPPA. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether Facebook could be compelled to provide the contents of two users’ accounts every 15 minutes for 30 days into the future based only on probable cause, the ordinary standard for a search warrant, or whether the State must instead satisfy certain requirements and apply for a wiretap order, which required an enhanced showing -- one beyond probable cause -- because gaining access to private communications in real time is considerably more intrusive than a typical search. In the two matters under review, trial courts quashed the State’s request for prospective information based on a Communications Data Warrant (CDW), which was the equivalent of a search warrant and can be issued on a showing of probable cause. The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and held that the State could obtain prospective electronic communications with a CDW, reasoning that the wiretap statute applied to the contemporaneous interception of electronic communications, not efforts to access communications in storage. The Supreme Court concluded that based on the language and structure of the relevant statutes, the State’s request for information from users’ accounts invokes heightened privacy protections. "The nearly contemporaneous acquisition of electronic communications here is the functional equivalent of wiretap surveillance and is therefore entitled to greater constitutional protection. New Jersey’s wiretap act applies in this case to safeguard individual privacy rights under the relevant statutes and the State Constitution." View "Facebook, Inc. v. State of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Vitamins Online, Inc. believed that its competitor, Defendant Heartwise, Inc. (d/b/a NatureWise), was misrepresenting the ingredients of its competitive nutritional supplements and manipulating those products’ Amazon reviews. Vitamins Online sued for violations of the Lanham Act and Utah’s common law Unfair Competition Law. The case proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which the district court ruled for Vitamins Online and ordered disgorgement of NatureWise’s profits for 2012 and 2013. The court also awarded Vitamins Online attorney fees and costs for NatureWise’s willful misrepresentation and for various discovery abuses. Both parties appealed. NatureWise contended the district court erred in finding that it made false or misleading representations about its own nutritional supplements’ ingredients and its Amazon reviews. NatureWise further asserted the district court erred in concluding that Vitamins Online was entitled to a presumption of injury for these misrepresentations. Vitamins Online contended the district court erred in bifurcating Vitamins Online’s injury into two separate time periods and requiring Vitamins Online to prove that a presumption of injury was applicable separately for each period. Vitamins Online also argued the district court erred in denying disgorgement for the second time period, and for failing to consider an award of punitive damages and an injunction as to NatureWise’s further manipulation of reviews. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not clearly err in applying a presumption of injury, and affirmed the award of profits, attorney fees, and costs, and found no reversable error in the amount awarded. The Court also held the district court failed to consider properly Vitamins Online’s request for punitive damages and an injunction; the Court remanded for the district court to reconsider. View "Vitamins Online, Inc. v. HeartWise, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for a company later acquired by the Paradies Shops. He, like many employees, entrusted his employer with sensitive, personally identifiable information (PII). In October 2020, Paradies suffered a ransomware attack on its administrative systems in which cybercriminals obtained the Social Security numbers of Plaintiff and other current and former employees. Shortly after learning of the data breach, Plaintiff brought claims for negligence and breach of implied contract on behalf of himself and those affected by the data breach, arguing Paradies should have protected the PII. He now appeals from the district court’s order granting Paradies’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. He contends the district court demanded too much at the pleadings stage.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the breach of implied contract claim and reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that, as the Georgia Supreme Court has noted, “traditional tort law is a rather blunt instrument for resolving all of the complex tradeoffs at issue in a case such as this, tradeoffs that may well be better resolved by the legislative process.” Nevertheless, having applied Georgia’s traditional tort principles, the court concluded Plaintiff has pled facts giving rise to a duty of care on the part of Paradies. Getting past summary judgment may prove a tougher challenge, but Plaintiff has pled enough for his negligence claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. View "Carlos Ramirez v. The Paradies Shops, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ava Morton appealed the denial of her complaint for an order against stalking. In May 2022, plaintiff’s mother filed a complaint on behalf of plaintiff, who was then seventeen years old, seeking an anti-stalking order against defendant Mayah Young. The affidavit attached to the complaint alleged that in April 2022, defendant had posted a video on the social media platform TikTok that included a half-naked picture of plaintiff. Plaintiff’s mother called the police, who went to defendant’s home, directed her to delete plaintiff’s picture from her phone, and warned her that she could end up in a lot of trouble because plaintiff was a minor. The complaint alleged that afterward, defendant posted another video in which she threatened to hurt plaintiff, followed by two more videos in which she suggested that she still had the picture and might send it to others. The civil division declined to issue a temporary order, concluding that the alleged conduct did not fall within the definition of stalking. Finding no reversible error in the civil division's judgment, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Morton v. Young" on Justia Law

A 2017 terrorist attack on an Istanbul nightclub, committed on behalf of ISIS, killed Alassaf and 38 others. Alassaf’s family sued Facebook, Twitter, and Google (which owns YouTube) under 18 U.S.C. 2333, which permits U.S. nationals who have been injured by an act of international terrorism to sue for damages. They alleged that the companies knowingly allowed ISIS and its supporters to use their platforms and “recommendation” algorithms for recruiting, fundraising, and spreading propaganda and have profited from the advertisements placed on ISIS content. The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint.A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. The 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, section 2333(d)(2), imposes secondary civil liability on anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” The Court concluded that it is not enough for a defendant to have given substantial assistance to a transcendent enterprise. A defendant must have knowingly provided substantial assistance in the commission of the actionable wrong—here, an act of international terrorism. The allegations do not show that the defendants gave ISIS such knowing and substantial assistance that they culpably participated in the attack. There are no allegations that the platforms were used to plan the attack; that the defendants gave ISIS special treatment; nor that the defendants carefully screened content before allowing users to upload it. The mere creation of media platforms is no more culpable than the creation of email, cell phones, or the internet generally.The allegations rest primarily on passive nonfeasance. The plaintiffs identify no duty that would require communication-providing services to terminate customers after discovering that the customers were using the service for illicit ends. The expansive scope of the claims would necessarily hold the defendants liable for aiding and abetting every ISIS terrorist act committed anywhere in the world. The Ninth Circuit improperly focused primarily on the value of the platforms to ISIS, rather than whether the defendants culpably associated themselves with the attack. View "Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh" on Justia Law

In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed coordinated attacks across Paris, killing 130 victims, including Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U.S. citizen. Gonzalez’s family sued Google under 18 U.S.C. 2333(a), (d)(2). They alleged that Google was directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez, citing the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS and ISIS supporters.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, finding most of the claims were barred by the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were claims based on allegations that Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-sharing system. The court held that these potential claims were not barred by section 230, but that the allegations nonetheless failed to state a viable claim. The complaint neither plausibly alleged that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-liability claim.The Supreme Court vacated. The complaint. independent of section 230, states little if any claim for relief. The Court noted its contemporaneously-issued “Twitter” decision and held that the complaint fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting. The Court remanded the case for consideration in light of the Twitter decision. View "Gonzalez v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

Meta Platforms, Inc. owns and operates the social media network Facebook. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Guam joined in a civil complaint charging Facebook with violating the antitrust laws (“the States.”) The States alleged that Facebook committed these violations as a result of its acquisitions of several actual or potential competitors and its restrictions on developers of applications that linked to Facebook. The States sought equitable relief. The district court dismissed their Complaint.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court that the States unduly delayed in bringing suit. The court further wrote that the district court properly considered the actual text of Facebook’s 2011 policy as quoted in the FTC’s complaint and properly disregarded the States’ allegations where those allegations were contrary to the policy’s text. In light of the complete text of Facebook’s competitor integration policy, the court rejected the States’ challenge to that policy. Further, the court held that the States’ exclusive dealing theory fails as a matter of law. View "State of New York v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Lamontagne was convicted by jury on four counts of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Defendant and the victim were in a three-year romantic relationship. The relationship ended, but defendant and the victim stayed in contact. During the summer of 2019, defendant learned that the victim was in a relationship with another man. Defendant saw an image on the internet of a naked woman tied in ropes and hanging from a tree (the “bondage image”). The woman’s face was blurred and the image contained no information identifying her. Defendant believed the bondage image depicted the victim. Defendant sent the image to the victim through Facebook Messenger. This interaction led to a discussion of possible sexual activity in which defendant and the victim could engage, including making a video of them having sex. According to defendant, he and the victim formed an agreement whereby if the victim did not break up with her new boyfriend, defendant could send the video to whomever he wished. Defendant and the victim created the video, after this alleged agreement. According to the State, the sexual encounter and the filming of the video were consensual, but there was no agreement for the video’s release. Rather, the State contended that after making the video, defendant indicated that, amongst other things, the victim must see him once a week and end her relationship with her new boyfriend or defendant would release the video. The State contended that every time the victim tried to offer an excuse for why she could not see defendant, he would become angry and threaten to release the video. On August 4, 2019, defendant sent a video to four individuals. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony that he believed the bondage image depicted the victim. The trial court held, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred, the proffered evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Judgment was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lamontagne" on Justia Law

Microsoft Corporation offers email security software to shield users from cyber threats. TocMail, Inc. is a relative newcomer to the cybersecurity scene and offers a product geared towards a specific type of threat called Internet Protocol (IP) evasion. TocMail sued Microsoft for false advertising—all within two months. In its complaint, TocMail alleged that Microsoft misled the public into believing that Microsoft’s product offered protection from IP evasion. And TocMail—who had been selling its product for two months, spent almost nothing on advertising and had not made a single sale—alleged billions of dollars in lost profits. TocMail brought two counts: false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act (count one); and contributory false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Microsoft.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of standing. The court explained that to establish an injury, in fact, a plaintiff must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The court wrote that TocMail failed to meet this standard because TocMail has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that it suffered any injury. TocMail didn’t offer testimony from any witness saying that he or she would have purchased TocMail’s product if not for Microsoft’s advertising. TocMail didn’t offer any expert testimony calculating TocMail’s lost sales from consumers who went with Microsoft. View "TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation" on Justia Law