Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

Louis Vuitton sued Managed Solutions Group, Inc. (MSG), Akanoc Solutions, Inc., and Steven Chen (collectively, Defendants) for contributory copyright and trademark infringement, contending that Defendants were liable for their role in hosting websites that directly infringed Louis Vuitton's trademarks and copyrights. After trial, a jury found Defendants liable and awarded damages against each defendant. In response to Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court set aside the jury's verdict and award against MSG. The district court otherwise denied the motion. The court affirmed the district court on all issues of liability raised by the appeal and cross-appeal but vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions that the district court award statutory damages in the amount of $10,500,000 for contributory trademark infringement and $300,000 for contributory copyright infringement, for which Akanoc and Chen should be jointly and severally liable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Between 2003 and 2006, more than 2,000 fell victim to defendants' internet fraud scheme that involved individuals outside the U.S., often based in Romania posing as sellers of goods on eBay and other internet auction sites. Victims were directed to send payment by wire transfer. The foreign co-schemers developed a network of individuals in the U.S., who collected payment using false identifications. Defendant S pled guilty to wire fraud, (18 U.S.C. 1343), and G pled guilty to several counts of wire fraud and two counts of receipt of stolen funds (18 U.S.C. 1343, 2315). On remand for sentencing, S was sentenced to 97 months and G to 78 months in prison, the same sentences originally imposed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the findings and reasonable inferences from the record supported accountability for the conduct of co-conspirators under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). View "United States v. Salem" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-profit company that blocks unwanted bulk e-mail, maintains a list of internet protocol addresses of spam distributors, which internet service providers use to block e-mails originating from those addresses. Plaintiff, a now-defunct internet marketing company, sued for tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and defamation. The district court granted default judgment and awarded $11,715,000 in damages. When defendant changed strategy, the Seventh Circuit affirmed default judgment but vacated the award. On remand, the court awarded a total of $27,002. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in the nominal amount of three dollars. The district court properly struck most of plaintiff's evidence, either as an appropriate discovery sanction or for proper procedural reasons. The evidence did not support an award of $27,000 in actual damages because plaintiff based its damage calculations on lost revenues rather than lost profits. View "e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's denial of certification of their putative class action in Mancini v. Ticketmaster; Stearns v. Ticketmaster, and Johnson v. Ticketmaster. Appellants' actions were directed against a number of entities that were said to have participated in a deceptive internet scheme, which induced numerous individuals to unwittingly sign up for a fee-based rewards program where amounts were charged to their credit cards or directly deducted from their bank accounts. The court held that Rule 23 did not give the district court broad discretion over certification of class actions and the district court erred when it based its exercise of that discretion on what turned out to be an inaccurate reading of the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200-17210. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of the motions for class certification of the UCL claims in Mancini and affirmed its determination that Mancini and Sanders were not proper representatives. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750-1784, claim in Stearns; affirmed the district court's refusal to certify a class regarding the CLRA injunctive relief claims in Mancini; reversed the district court's dismissal of the Johnson action regarding the CLRA claim; and affirmed its refusal to certify a class regarding the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA), 15 U.S.C. 1693-1693r, claim in Mancini. View "Stearns, et al. v. Ticketmaster Corp, et al.; Johnson, et al. v. Ticketmaster Corp, et al.; Mancini, et al. v. Ticketmaster Corp, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this consolidated class action allege copyright infringements arising from defendant publishers' unauthorized electronic reproduction of plaintiff authors' written works. The district court certified a class for settlement purposes and approved a settlement agreement over the objection of ten class members (objectors). In this appeal, objectors challenged the propriety of the settlement's release provision, the certification of the class, and the process by which the district court reached its decisions. Although the court rejected the objectors' arguments regarding the release, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class and approving the settlement because the named plaintiffs failed to adequately represent the interest of all class members. The court did not reach the procedural challenges, which were moot in light of the court's class certification holding. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued defendant, claiming, among other things, copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. 501, trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. 1114(a), and unfair competition under New York state law. At issue was whether the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C. 109(a), applied to copyrighted workers produced outside the United States but imported and resold in the United States. The court held that the first sale doctrine did not apply to works manufactured outside of the United States; the district court did not err in declining to instruct the jury regarding the unsettled state of the first sale doctrine; and the district court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant's gross revenues. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng" on Justia Law

CollegeSource, Inc. (CollegeSource), a California corporation with its principal place of business in California, sued AcademyOne, Inc. (AcademyOne), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, in federal district court for the Southern District of California, alleging that AcademyOne misappropriated material from CollegeSource's websites. AcademyOne moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and the district court granted its motion. The court held that AcademyOne was subject to specific personal jurisdiction, but not general personal jurisdiction, in California with respect to CollegeSource's misappropriation claims. Under the doctrine of pendant personal jurisdiction, AcademyOne was also subject to personal jurisdiction in California with respect to the remainder of CollegeSource's claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of CollegeSource's complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc." on Justia Law

Perfect 10 moved for a preliminary injunction against Google, arguing that it was entitled to an injunction because Google's web and image search and related caching feature, its Blogger service, and its practice of forwarding Perfect 10's takedown notices to chillingeffects.org constituted copyright infringement. Perfect 10 also argued that it was entitled to an injunction based upon Google's alleged violation of the rights of publicity assigned to Perfect 10 by some of its models. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying Perfect 10's request for preliminary injunctive relief. The court held that Perfect 10 had not shown a sufficient causal connection between irreparable harm to Perfect 10's business and Google's operation of its search engine. Therefore, the court held that because Perfect 10 had failed to satisfy this necessary requirement for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief, the district court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. View "Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

The Township brought a putative class action on behalf of itself and similarly situated New Jersey municipalities, alleging that defendants, companies who operate hotel booking sites online, owe unpaid hotel occupancy taxes. Defendants calculate the tax owed based on the negotiated rate paid by a defendant (wholesale rate), not the higher rate charged consumers (retail rate). Defendants pay the tax to the hotel, which remits it to the state taxing authority.The district court dismissed on grounds of prudential standing, holding that state officials have the right to enforce the statutory tax scheme. The Third Circuit affirmed. The Township is not the proper plaintiff. Authority to adopt a hotel tax is granted municipalities by N.J. Stat. 40:48F-1, but administration and collection are left to state officials. View "Twp. of Lyndhurst v. Priceline.com Inc." on Justia Law

The rejected patent claim is one of several that describe a system for sending information (electronic mail) from an originating processor (personal computer) to a destination processor (mobile computer) using an intermediary (radio frequency receiver). Prior art systems required connection to a public switched phone line and were limited by difficulty in locating a phone jack. The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the rejection, construing the term "destination processor," to mean the "particular end node device to which the intended user recipient of electronic mail has immediate and direct physical access when accessing and viewing electronic mail;" determining that the applicant was not entitled to claim priority; and finding that the claim was anticipated by prior art. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The Board properly relied on the written description in construing "destination processor." Nothing in 35 U.S.C. 301 prohibits an examiner from determining, on re-examination, whether a priority date was properly claimed during the original examination; such a determination was proper in this case because the examiner did not consider priority during the original prosecution. View "In re NTP, Inc." on Justia Law