Justia Internet Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Justin Lamontagne was convicted by jury on four counts of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Defendant and the victim were in a three-year romantic relationship. The relationship ended, but defendant and the victim stayed in contact. During the summer of 2019, defendant learned that the victim was in a relationship with another man. Defendant saw an image on the internet of a naked woman tied in ropes and hanging from a tree (the “bondage image”). The woman’s face was blurred and the image contained no information identifying her. Defendant believed the bondage image depicted the victim. Defendant sent the image to the victim through Facebook Messenger. This interaction led to a discussion of possible sexual activity in which defendant and the victim could engage, including making a video of them having sex. According to defendant, he and the victim formed an agreement whereby if the victim did not break up with her new boyfriend, defendant could send the video to whomever he wished. Defendant and the victim created the video, after this alleged agreement. According to the State, the sexual encounter and the filming of the video were consensual, but there was no agreement for the video’s release. Rather, the State contended that after making the video, defendant indicated that, amongst other things, the victim must see him once a week and end her relationship with her new boyfriend or defendant would release the video. The State contended that every time the victim tried to offer an excuse for why she could not see defendant, he would become angry and threaten to release the video. On August 4, 2019, defendant sent a video to four individuals. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony that he believed the bondage image depicted the victim. The trial court held, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court concurred, the proffered evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Judgment was affirmed. View "New Hampshire v. Lamontagne" on Justia Law

Microsoft Corporation offers email security software to shield users from cyber threats. TocMail, Inc. is a relative newcomer to the cybersecurity scene and offers a product geared towards a specific type of threat called Internet Protocol (IP) evasion. TocMail sued Microsoft for false advertising—all within two months. In its complaint, TocMail alleged that Microsoft misled the public into believing that Microsoft’s product offered protection from IP evasion. And TocMail—who had been selling its product for two months, spent almost nothing on advertising and had not made a single sale—alleged billions of dollars in lost profits. TocMail brought two counts: false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act (count one); and contributory false and misleading advertising under the Lanham Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Microsoft.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of standing. The court explained that to establish an injury, in fact, a plaintiff must show “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” The court wrote that TocMail failed to meet this standard because TocMail has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that it suffered any injury. TocMail didn’t offer testimony from any witness saying that he or she would have purchased TocMail’s product if not for Microsoft’s advertising. TocMail didn’t offer any expert testimony calculating TocMail’s lost sales from consumers who went with Microsoft. View "TocMail Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation" on Justia Law

Birmingham attorney Daniel Flickinger posted a message on his personal Facebook social-media page in which he appeared to reference the death George Floyd, which occurred while Floyd was being arrested and was recorded. The social-media post, along with an allegedly "counterfeit" social-media "profile," was later shared with Flickinger's supervising attorney at his law firm by Lawrence Tracy King, an attorney with the Birmingham law firm of King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. Shortly thereafter, Flickinger was forced to resign. Flickinger's post was also shared by members of a "private" Facebook group, who then posted a series of offensive comments about him both personally and professionally. Flickinger sued King and the King law firm asserting claims of defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The King defendants filed a motion to dismiss Flickinger's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the circuit court granted the motion. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's defamation and invasion-of-privacy claims. However, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment insofar as it dismissed Flickinger's tortious-interference claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

Ung stole cryptocurrencies from multiple victims in 2018, exploiting a common website security feature: A user can prompt a website hosting an account to send a text message to the user’s phone with a security code that temporarily allows access to the account. Ung employed “SIM swapping” in which the thief tricks the victim’s phone carrier into switching the victim’s phone number to a SIM card in the thief’s phone. The thief then prompts the website hosting the victim’s financial account to send a temporary security code to the hijacked phone; the thief accesses the account and transfers the assets.In 2021, Ung pleaded no contest to identity theft, attempted grand theft, and 10 counts of felony grand theft. He admitted a white-collar crime enhancement; he committed three offenses after his bail was revoked. The court imposed a 10-year prison term, entered a general restitution order, and later ordered Ung to make restitution by transferring cryptocurrencies to the victims in the same kinds and amounts he had stolen. Ung argued the order violated his due process rights to notice. He estimates the value of the cryptocurrencies was about $1.56 million when he stole them; the value was about $15.9 million by the time of the restitution hearing.The court of appeal affirmed. Under the statute, the value of stolen property is the replacement cost of like property. By stealing the victims’ cryptocurrency, Ung deprived them of the ability to sell it for a profit after its value increased; whatever profits they lost were a direct consequence of Ung’s conduct. View "People v. Ung" on Justia Law

Skillz provides a mobile platform that hosts games in which players compete for cash prizes. To participate in paid-entry competitions, a user must save the player account; after entering a date of birth, the user must tap a box with the word “Next.” Below the “Next” box is the advisory statement: “By tapping ‘Next,’ I agree to the Terms of Service and the Privacy Policy.” A hyperlink, if tapped, takes the user to Skillz’s terms of service. Gostev saved a Skillz player account in 2019. The Terms of Service then had 15 pages.Gostev sued Skillz, alleging that its games constituted illegal gambling, predatory and unlawful practices, and violated the Unfair Competition Law and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Gostev alleged the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. Skillz argued that Gostev’s challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration provision had to be submitted to an arbitrator.The court of appeal affirmed a finding that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court noted provisions that a plaintiff’s damages are limited, the arbitration must occur in San Francisco, a plaintiff only has one year to bring his claim, the parties must split the arbitration fees and costs, and the defendant can obtain equitable relief without posting a bond or security. Unconscionability ”permeates the agreement such that severance is unavailable,” View "Gostev v. Skillz Platform, Inc." on Justia Law

A major data breach compromised sensitive consumer information on thousands of credit cards. In this appeal, we address who must pay for the cleanup. Beginning in 2014, hackers compromised credit card data at multiple businesses owned by Landry’s Inc. (“Landry’s”). Many of those cards belonged to Visa and Mastercard. In response, Visa and Mastercard imposed over twenty million dollars in assessments on JPMorgan Chase and its subsidiary Paymentech (collectively, “Chase”), who were responsible for securely processing card purchases at Landry’s properties. Chase then sued Landry’s for indemnification, and Landry’s impleaded Visa and Mastercard. The district court dismissed Landry’s third-party complaints against Visa and Mastercard and granted summary judgment for Chase, finding that Landry’s had a contractual obligation to indemnify Chase. Landry’s argued that it should not have to indemnify Chase because the assessments are not an enforceable form of liquidated damages.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that since Landry’s indemnification obligation stems from its own acts or omissions under the Merchant Agreement, the debt is its own. Further, the court wrote that Landry’s alleged for its deceptive business practices claims that the assessments were “invalid” under the Payment Brand Rules and “applicable law” and, therefore, the Payment Brands’ “imposition and collection of the [assessments] was an unlawful business practice.” Because these claims turn on the assessments’ enforceability under Chase’s contracts with the Payment Brands, they are functionally the same as the subrogated claims. Since Landry’s cannot challenge the Payment Brands over those contracts as Chase’s subrogee, it cannot do so through a change in labeling. View "Paymentech v. Landry's" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs SkyHop Global, LLC, SkyHop Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “SkyHop”) and Defendant company owner and his company Indyzen, Inc. (collectively, “Indyzen”) have developed and deployed digital software aimed at transporting crew members to and from airports across the country. SkyHop has about eighty contracts with fifteen airlines, including major carriers like Delta, American, and United. SkyHop and Indyzen dispute who owns the digital software. And beyond that, they disagree on where their dispute should be decided. Indyzen has filed an arbitration action in California (where it is based), alleging various forms of breach of contract and other promises. Meanwhile, SkyHop has filed a federal lawsuit in Florida (where it is based), alleging that Indyzen violated the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and the Florida Computer Abuse and Data Recovery Act (“CADRA”). In response, Indyzen sought to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court entered an order dismissing SkyHop’s complaint.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order. The court reasoned that the allegations in SkyHop’s complaint suggest that SkyHop is the rightful owner of the digital software. And because Indyzen has refused to relinquish possession of the digital software without additional payment, SkyHop’s complaint states a cause of action under the CFAA. The complaint therefore satisfies the Florida long-arm statute. And it also meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause because the emails that Indyzen sent into Florida triggered SkyHop’s claims. View "SkyHop Technologies, Inc., et al. v. Praveen Narra, et al." on Justia Law

DirecTV and Dish Network (“Defendants”) provide video services in part through the Internet. The City of Creve Coeur filed this class action in Missouri state court on behalf of local government authorities, seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable under the Video Services Providers Act (“VSPA”) and implementing local ordinances, plus injunctive relief, an accounting of unpaid fees, and damages. Defendants removed the action based on diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the state court entered an interlocutory order declaring that VSPA payments are fees, rather than taxes, DirecTV filed a second notice of removal, arguing this order established the required federal jurisdiction. The district court granted Creve Coeur’s motion to remand.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on different grounds. The court explained that the district court’s remand order plainly stated that the remand was based on comity principles as articulated in Levin, not on “state-tax based comity concerns.” Comity as a basis to remand was raised and fully argued in the first remand proceeding. Federal courts have long precluded two bites at this apple. Second, the Supreme Court in Levin emphatically stated that the century-old comity doctrine is not limited to the state-tax-interference concerns that later led Congress to enact the TIA. Third, the state court’s December 2020 Order addressed, preliminarily, only the VSPA fee-or-tax issue under state law. It did not address the broader considerations comity addresses. The state court order in no way overruled or undermined the basis for the district court’s first remand order. Therefore, DirecTV failed to establish the essential basis for a second removal. View "City of Creve Coeur v. DirecTV LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Shenzhen Stone Network Information Ltd. (“SSN”) appealed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Appellee Prudential Insurance Company of America’s (“Prudential”) cybersquatting claim. Prudential owns several registered trademarks on the term PRU and other PRU-formative marks. Prudential initiated the underlying action after discovering that SSN had registered the domain name PRU.COM. Prudential alleged that SSN violated the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), by registering a domain name identical to Prudential’s distinctive mark with the bad faith intent to profit. The district court determined that SSN could be held liable for cybersquatting because the ACPA is not limited to the initial registration of a domain name but encompasses subsequent re-registrations as well. The district court concluded that SSN possessed the bad faith intent to profit from the disputed domain name and granted Prudential’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, SSN contests the district court’s ruling that SSN acted in bad faith when registering the disputed domain name.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that SSN acted in bad faith and that SSN is not entitled to the benefit of the ACPA’s safe harbor provision. The court reasoned that SSN failed to satisfy the statute’s safe harbor provision. First, SSN’s self-serving denials of subjective belief that its use of the PRU.COM domain name was lawful are insufficient to defeat summary judgment absent objective corroboration. Further, SSN did not have reasonable grounds to believe that its registration of the PRU.COM domain name was otherwise lawful. View "The Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Shenzhen Stone Network Information Ltd." on Justia Law

Google’s 093 patent application discloses methods for filtering the results of an internet search query such that only results appropriate for the user (e.g., age-appropriate) are displayed.. According to the disclosed method, each result of a search query is assigned a “content rating class” indicating the suitability of the associated content (e.g., suitable for all ages). The Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed an examiner’s rejection of multiple claims of the application, citing 35 U.S.C. 103.The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected arguments that the claims were obvious in light of prior art because those arguments did not reflect the reasoning or findings the Board actually invoked. Although the Board concluded that modifying prior art to take into account query length would have been obvious, there was no discussion of how such a modification would be accomplished. The Board’s expressed reasoning cannot sustain its rejection of the claims. The prior art arguments rest on factual predicates unaddressed by the examiner or Board. View "In Re Google LLC" on Justia Law