Justia Real Estate & Property Law Opinion Summaries

In 1982, Lesley Phillips purchased an apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, assuming a preexisting mortgage. Phillips' spouse, Linda Pinti, was added to the deed in 2005. In 2008, Pinti and Phillips refinanced with a $160,000 promissory note and mortgage from Emigrant Mortgage Company (EMC). They defaulted on the note in 2009, and EMC initiated foreclosure proceedings. In 2012, EMC mistakenly issued a discharge of the mortgage, which Pinti recorded in 2015 after a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision voided the foreclosure sale.EMC filed a federal action in 2016 to strike the discharge, but the court dismissed it, ruling EMC was not the mortgagee. Emigrant Residential, LLC (Emigrant) then filed a new action in 2019. The district court granted summary judgment for Emigrant, striking the discharge and rejecting Pinti's counterclaims. Pinti appealed, contesting the district court's rulings on standing, the discharge, unclean hands, restoration to the status quo, and her Chapter 93A claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Emigrant had standing as the holder of the note, which was sufficient under Article III. The court found no genuine dispute that the discharge was a mistake, supported by EMC's policies and the fact that the note was never returned to Pinti. The court also ruled that Emigrant was entitled to equitable relief, rejecting Pinti's arguments of unclean hands and the inability to restore the status quo. Finally, the court upheld the dismissal of Pinti's Chapter 93A claim as time-barred. View "Emigrant Residential LLC v. Pinti" on Justia Law

A former landlord sued two commercial tenants and their law firm, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The claims arose from prior litigation where the tenants had successfully counterclaimed for damages against the landlord. The landlord claimed that the tenants' actions during the prior litigation caused him emotional distress and were malicious and abusive.In the prior proceedings, the landlord had filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action against the tenants, which resulted in the tenants counterclaiming for breach of contract and other damages. The superior court dismissed the landlord's FED claim and some of the tenants' counterclaims but awarded the tenants damages for breach of contract related to property maintenance. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.The superior court dismissed the landlord's new claims, taking judicial notice of the prior proceedings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed because the prior proceedings did not terminate entirely in the landlord's favor, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose separate from the litigation process.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. It held that the superior court properly took judicial notice of the prior proceedings and did not need to convert the motion to dismiss. The court agreed that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed due to the lack of favorable termination, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose independent from the litigation process. View "Griffith v. Hemphill" on Justia Law

David Knellinger and Robert Storey discovered that the state of Colorado had taken possession of their property under the Revised Uniform Unclaimed Property Act (RUUPA). They filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Colorado's unclaimed property scheme violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that Colorado took their property for public use without just compensation and did not provide them with notice or compensation.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. The court found that Knellinger and Storey failed to sufficiently allege ownership of the property at issue, partly because they did not file an administrative claim to establish ownership as required by RUUPA. The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' equitable claims, concluding that § 1983 provided an adequate basis for obtaining just compensation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief. The appellate court held that Knellinger and Storey had plausibly alleged that Colorado took their property for public use without just compensation, which is sufficient to confer standing. The court emphasized that property owners need not file administrative claims with Colorado before suing for just compensation under the Takings Clause. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' equitable claims, as § 1983 provides an adequate remedy for obtaining just compensation.The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' damages claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Knellinger v. Young" on Justia Law

Boone River, LLC purchased a tax certificate and later obtained a tax deed for property owned by Nancy J. Miles, Cheryl L. Bettin, and Robert R. Moninger. Boone River transferred the property to 11T NE, LLC, which then sued to quiet title. The court voided the tax deed and quieted title in favor of Miles, Bettin, and Moninger. Boone River and 11T subsequently filed a complaint for unjust enrichment, seeking compensation for taxes paid and maintenance costs. Miles and Bettin counterclaimed, citing an offer of judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-901, which Boone River and 11T did not accept.The district court initially ruled in favor of Boone River and 11T, awarding them $16,918.68. Miles and Bettin appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the judgment against them, affirming it only against Moninger. Following the mandate, the district court entered judgment in favor of Miles and Bettin. Miles and Bettin then filed a motion for costs under § 25-901, which Boone River and 11T opposed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the district court erred in dismissing Miles and Bettin’s motion for costs. The Supreme Court clarified that the obligation under § 25-901 for the plaintiff to pay costs applies when the plaintiff fails to obtain a judgment for more than the offer, including when judgment is entered against the plaintiff. The court also held that an offer of judgment under § 25-901 retains its cost-shifting effect throughout the case, including on remand.The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to determine the costs to which Miles and Bettin are entitled under § 25-901, explicitly stating that "cost" under § 25-901 does not include attorney fees. View "Boone River, LLC v. Miles" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the possession of Touro Synagogue, the oldest active synagogue in the United States, located in Newport, Rhode Island. Congregation Shearith Israel (Shearith Israel) sought to evict Congregation Jeshuat Israel (Jeshuat Israel) from the synagogue. Shearith Israel sent a notice of termination to Jeshuat Israel, demanding they vacate the premises by February 1, 2023. Jeshuat Israel did not vacate, leading Shearith Israel to file an action for trespass and repossession by ejectment.The Rhode Island Superior Court ruled in favor of Shearith Israel, granting them the right to immediate possession of the property. Jeshuat Israel appealed, raising four arguments: the validity of the termination notice, the existence of a condition precedent in a 1945 agreement, the modification of a 1908 lease by the 1945 agreement, and the waiver of a defense by Shearith Israel.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that the termination notice was valid and that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also determined that the 1945 agreement did not modify the lease to include a condition precedent requiring consultation before eviction. The agreement's requirement for consultation pertained only to matters of historical preservation and not to eviction actions. The court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, granting Shearith Israel the right to take immediate possession of Touro Synagogue. View "Congregation Shearith Israel v. Congregation Jeshuat Israel" on Justia Law

The case involves a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the Oregon State Building and Construction Trades Council (OBTC) against a preliminary injunction issued by the Marion County Circuit Court. The injunction was part of a public contracting dispute between the Oregon-Columbia Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT). AGC challenged the process used by ODOT to set the terms of "community benefit contracts" for certain highway improvement projects under ORS 279C.308.The Marion County Circuit Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing ODOT from using the terms of a Community Workforce Agreement (CWA) in any projects while AGC's challenge to the validity of the CWA under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was pending before the Oregon Court of Appeals. AGC had filed three cases: one in the circuit court and two petitions for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. The circuit court case sought declaratory relief and an injunction against ODOT's use of the CWA. The Court of Appeals certified the case challenging the CWA's validity to the Oregon Supreme Court, which accepted the certification.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided the challenge to the validity of the CWA in a related case, Oregon-Columbia Chapter of AGC v. ODOT. As a result, the preliminary injunction issued by the circuit court expired, rendering OBTC's request for mandamus relief moot. Consequently, the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "Oregon-Columbia Chapter Associated General Contractors of America v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The City of Tea passed a resolution imposing a special assessment on properties abutting a road construction project, including property owned by KJD, LLC. The City found that the improvement conferred special benefits on the abutting properties beyond those experienced by the public. KJD objected to the assessment, arguing it was unconstitutional as the project did not confer a special benefit on its property. The circuit court held that KJD did not rebut the presumption that the City’s assessment was valid and did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the City’s findings were incorrect, thus denying KJD’s objection.KJD appealed to the Supreme Court of South Dakota. The Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo, noting that the City’s findings in its resolution are presumed correct and that KJD had the burden to rebut this presumption with substantial, credible evidence. The Court found that KJD failed to present such evidence, particularly as it did not provide testimony or evidence at a trial to counter the City’s findings. The Court also noted that the City’s method of calculating the assessment based on the cost of the project was constitutionally permissible and that the City’s findings regarding the special benefits, such as improved aesthetics and safety, were supported by the project’s features.The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that KJD did not meet its burden to prove that the special assessment was unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the City’s findings and the special assessment were valid and did not exceed the value of the benefits conferred on KJD’s property. View "KJD, LLC v. City of Tea" on Justia Law

Asegedech Kelecha rented a room in her house to Sara Menghesha starting in 2019. On May 1, 2020, Kelecha changed the locks without giving Menghesha a key, leaving her homeless during the COVID-19 pandemic. Menghesha sued Kelecha for unlawful eviction and obtained injunctive relief to regain access to the property. She then won a partial motion for summary judgment on liability for unlawful eviction. At a jury trial on damages, Menghesha was awarded $7,500 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages.After the trial, a juror emailed stating disagreement with the decisions made during deliberations. Kelecha filed a motion for a new trial based on this email. The Superior Court initially ordered an evidentiary hearing but later reconsidered and denied the motion, concluding that such an inquiry would impermissibly intrude into the jury’s deliberative process.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Kelecha argued that the Superior Court should have held a hearing before denying her new trial motion and that the punitive damages were unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of malice and were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, stating that jurors generally cannot impeach their own verdicts under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The court found that any inquiry into the juror’s email would fall under the no-impeachment rule and that no exceptions applied. Additionally, Kelecha’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of evidence for punitive damages and the excessiveness of the award were deemed forfeited because they were not raised in the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld the jury’s verdict and the Superior Court’s rulings. View "Kelecha v. Menghesha" on Justia Law

Potomac Place Associates, LLC sought to evict Walter Mendez from his apartment following the death of his mother, Teresa Aparicio, with whom he co-signed a lease in 2003. The building was converted into a condominium in 2006 under the Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act (RHCSA). Ms. Aparicio, being a low-income elderly tenant, was exempt from the requirement to purchase or vacate, allowing her and Mr. Mendez to continue renting. After Ms. Aparicio's death in 2019, Potomac Place issued a notice to Mr. Mendez to either purchase the apartment or vacate, which he refused, leading to the eviction attempt.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Mendez, rejecting Potomac Place's argument that the exemption applied only during Ms. Aparicio's lifetime. The court found that Mr. Mendez's tenancy was governed by the Rental Housing Act (RHA), which did not provide grounds for his eviction based on the expiration of the lease or the death of a co-tenant.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo, focusing on the statutory interpretation of the RHA and RHCSA. The court held that the RHCSA's protections for low-income elderly and disabled tenants continued post-conversion, and the RHA did not allow for eviction based on the expiration of the lease or the death of a co-tenant. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that Potomac Place could not evict Mr. Mendez under Section 42-3505.01(j) of the RHA, as the conversion process had been completed in 2006, and the RHCSA no longer applied to Mr. Mendez's tenancy. View "Potomac Place Associates, LLC v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Salvador Rivas purchased a condominium unit with a mortgage loan from Flagstar Bank, secured by a deed of trust. Rivas fell behind on his condo association dues, leading the New Hampshire House Condominium Unit Owners Association (NHH) to foreclose on the unit in 2014. The foreclosure sale terms indicated the unit was sold subject to Flagstar’s first deed of trust of approximately $256,632. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC (AFI) bought the unit for $26,000, despite its tax-assessed value of $237,930. Flagstar later filed for judicial foreclosure, claiming its lien was extinguished by NHH’s foreclosure sale.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Flagstar’s judicial foreclosure claim, reasoning that the lien was extinguished by the prior foreclosure sale. The court also dismissed Flagstar’s claims for declaratory relief, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment as time-barred, as they were raised for the first time in an amended complaint filed almost four years after the foreclosure sale.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court agreed with Flagstar that its judicial foreclosure claim was improperly dismissed, as rebuttals to affirmative defenses are not subject to any statute of limitations. However, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the alternative ground that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on the judicial foreclosure claim. The court held that the 2014 foreclosure sale was not unconscionable as a matter of law, given the legal uncertainty at the time regarding whether Flagstar’s lien would survive the sale.The court also rejected Flagstar’s remaining arguments, except for the unjust enrichment claim against AFI. The court found that this claim should not have been dismissed as time-barred and could not be resolved on summary judgment. The case was remanded for trial on the unjust enrichment claim against AFI, while the trial court’s judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Advanced Financial Investments, LLC" on Justia Law